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Deference Determinations and Stealth
Constitutional Decision Making
Eric Berger
ABSTRACT: Courts deciding constitutional cases frequently have to make
deference determinations—that is, decisions about whether to respect a
political branch’s factual findings and policy judgments because of that
branch’s institutional superiority. The U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to a
wide range of these determinations, however, is inconsistent and undertheorized. Indeed, the Court’s difficulties with deference determinations
mirror broader failures to resolve carefully and consistently a number of
“stealth” determinations that recur in constitutional cases—determinations
that fall outside the black-letter doctrinal framework but can still greatly
impact a case’s outcome.
Rather than relying on pithy platitudes about each government branch’s
strengths and weaknesses, courts should examine the actual behavior and
processes of the relevant governmental institution before deciding whether
deference is appropriate. This contextual, institutional approach would
provide better incentives for Congress and administrative agencies to craft
policy utilizing their expertise and reinforcing their political accountability.
It would also offer a more searching, rigorous model for courts approaching
other extra-doctrinal determinations, thus improving the legal status of both
deference determinations themselves and stealth constitutional
determinations more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, a well-known, contentious decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), which authorized state employees to recover money damages
from their state employers for violations of the Act.1 Congress had sought to
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from such lawsuits pursuant to its
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 In so doing,
Congress made factual findings regarding the pervasiveness of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.3 When the Court struck
down that abrogation of sovereign immunity, it rejected the relevance of
those findings, faulting Congress for not showing enough evidence of state
discrimination against the disabled.4 The full doctrinal picture is, of course,
more complicated, but the Court was decidedly undeferential to Congress
despite the factual record it had gathered.
The Court’s approach to evaluating congressional findings, however, is
inconsistent, both in the Section 5 context and more generally. Indeed, just
two years after Garrett, the Court in Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs was far more respectful of Congress’s findings in upholding the Family
and Medical Leave Act’s (“FMLA”) abrogation of state sovereign immunity.5
Breaking from Garrett’s undeferential approach, Hibbs emphasized the
evidence Congress had amassed and found it sufficient to “justif[y]
Congress’ passage of prophylactic § 5 legislation.”6
The FMLA findings the Court accepted in Hibbs, however, seem quite
similar to the ADA findings rejected in Garrett. Both records, for instance,
relied heavily on private-sector labor statistics, yet the Court did little to
explain why such facts were inadequate in Garrett but sufficient in Hibbs.7 In
reality, the discrepancy is best explained not by Congress’s findings, but
rather by doctrinal differences involving the standard of review for the
underlying discrimination Congress sought to prevent.8 But while those
differences might help justify the divergent outcomes in the two cases, they
neither reconcile the Court’s varying degrees of deference to congressional
fact-finding nor justify the Court’s failure to explain those different levels of
deference.
1. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
2. Id. at 363–64.
3. Id. at 369 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000)).
4. See id. at 370.
5. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
6. Id. at 730.
7. See id. at 730 n.3 (conceding that Congress’s findings addressed “policies in the private
sector,” but contending that such policies “differ[] little from those offered private sector
employees”).
8. See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
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The discrepancy between Garrett and Hibbs is hardly anomalous. To the
contrary, it reflects a pattern of judicial inconsistency on the question of
deference—and not just in the area of congressional fact-finding.
“Deference” is a poorly defined term, but as I use it here, it addresses the
judiciary’s decision in a constitutional case to afford special respect to the
determination of another branch of government due to that branch’s
relative institutional strengths. When a court applies deferential rational basis
review because a policy does not burden a suspect class, the court’s scrutiny
is guided by substantive factors. However, when a court, say, affords special
respect to a policy due to that government branch’s expertise, it is deferring
on institutional grounds. Institution-based deference, in other words, differs
from the tier of scrutiny triggered by substantive, doctrinal analysis and is
narrower than constitutional deference writ large.9 Of course, in practice the
lines between institution-based deference and substantive doctrine are not
always so neat, and the analyses can blur together.10 That said, courts
regularly invoke institutional factors when deciding whether to defer in
constitutional cases and often justify that deference on the political—that is,
nonjudicial—branches’ ostensible superior epistemic and democratic
authority.11
The Supreme Court’s deference determinations in a wide range of
constitutional contexts are often inchoate and under-theorized.12 Garrett and
Hibbs illustrate the problem nicely, because they deal with the same source
of congressional power, but the Court’s approach to congressional factfinding in other contexts is similarly erratic and poorly explained. The Court
does no better when it is deciding whether to grant deference to other
government institutions, like administrative agencies, based on their
ostensible expertise or political authority. Even when the Court reviews

9. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1214–17 (1978) (explaining that judicial restraint
rests “not upon analysis of the constitutional concept but upon various concerns of the Court
about its institutional role” relative to other governmental institutions).
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. This Article does not address “deference” as it is used in other senses. For example,
“deference” can refer to the Court’s general willingness to uphold challenged governmental
policies unconnected to an institutional analysis. It also can refer to judicial respect for lower
court factual findings or for agency decisions in administrative law cases. Those types of
“deference” are beyond the scope of this Article.
12. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 112 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (claiming
the Supreme Court’s deference decisions are mere “hollow shibboleths”); Eric Berger,
Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making,
91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2011) [hereinafter Berger, Administrative Law Norms] (arguing that
judicial deference to administrative agencies in constitutional individual rights cases is
“inconsistent and inchoate”); Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1061, 1095 (2008) (concluding that deference is highly “undertheorized and misunderstood,”
due in part to the Supreme Court’s lack of explanation).
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policies by “special” governmental institutions, like prisons, or in “special”
contexts, like national security, its approach lacks a theoretical framework
and is surprisingly inconsistent.
The Court’s lack of a meaningful methodology for determining when to
defer largely results from its failure to closely examine the institution in
question. Given that deference determinations supposedly acquiesce to an
actor’s unique competence in a given area, one might think that a rigorous
institutional analysis would shape courts’ approaches to these questions. In
reality, the Supreme Court rarely engages in such analysis. To the contrary,
its deference determinations are often poorly justified, resting less on
careful consideration and more on pithy platitudes about each political
branch’s strengths and weaknesses. Sometimes the Court simply announces
its deference determination without providing any supporting legal analysis.
And even when the Court does explain its reasoning, it often fails to
reconcile its arguments with approaches to similar questions in previous
cases, even though decisions to defer to the political branches can
substantially shape the outcome of many constitutional cases.13 Academics,
too, have paid inadequate attention to these issues, focusing primarily on
the tiers of scrutiny rather than institutional factors.14
Interestingly, the Court’s difficulties with deference determinations
reflect a broader failure to carefully and consistently resolve a number of
such “stealth” determinations—decisions that recur in constitutional cases
but fall outside traditional doctrinal categories.15 These stealth
determinations share certain characteristics.16 First, these determinations
arise frequently in constitutional cases. Second, despite their common
13. See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights,
84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 953 (1999) (“The practice of deference has drastic effects on the
outcomes of cases . . . .”).
14. See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic
Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) [hereinafter Berger,
Theory of Deference] (“Scholars . . . have focused little on the issue of deference outside the
obvious context of the tiers of scrutiny.”); Horwitz, supra note 12, at 1061 (“Deference . . . has
received surprisingly little . . . attention in constitutional scholarship.”). To the extent scholars
have examined institutional deference, they have focused primarily on deference to
congressional fact-findings rather than the broader array of relevant institutional contexts. See
infra Part II.B.1.
15. Professors Eskridge and Frickey have used the term “stealth constitutionalism” in a
different sense, referring to the Supreme Court’s practice of promoting under-enforced
constitutional norms through clear-statement rules in statutory interpretation. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 85 (1994). Professor Friedman has written about the dangers of “stealth
overruling.” See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 616 (2010). The focus of this Article, by contrast, is
constitutional cases in which the Court makes important, extra-doctrinal determinations
without sufficient explanation or consistency.
16. For more examples of stealth determinations, see infra Part I.C.
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recurrence, the Supreme Court often fails to thoroughly explain its
reasoning when making such determinations. Third, and consequently,
these determinations typically are not reflected in black-letter constitutional
doctrine. Fourth, the Court often fails to adequately reconcile the
determinations across cases, so that its approach in one case often lacks
precedential effect in another. Fifth, the Court also fails to explain just how
central these determinations are to the resolution of some cases.
“Stealth” is, in some ways, an imperfect term to describe these
determinations, many of which are made explicitly, such as when the Court
announces that it is deferring to a certain government actor.17 To this
extent, the term “stealth” is misleading insofar as it connotes invisibility. But
“stealth” is also defined as “intended not to attract attention,”18 and indeed,
the Court’s summary pronouncements in these areas seek to escape careful
scrutiny. Even when the Court does acknowledge making such a
determination, it usually provides little insight into how it did so. Indeed,
when the Court makes stealth determinations, it often confidently
announces its decision without elaboration and reference to the kinds of
professional legal norms that usually guide judicial decision making in other
areas.19
This Article’s goals are twofold. With respect to deference
determinations specifically, this Article highlights how courts too often make
institution-based deference determinations with scant attention to the actual
behavior of the institution at issue. More diligent, consistent attention to
such institutional matters will result in deference determinations that are
both more deserved and more methodologically consistent. Indeed, though
deference determinations are often short-changed by courts and scholars
alike, they are crucial to the enterprise of constitutional decision making.
Constitutional law often boils down to the question of “who decides,” and

17. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (deferring to the educational
judgment of a state university’s law school); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 9091 (1987)
(noting that “courts should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference
owned to corrections officials’” and upholding a rule barring inmate-to-inmate correspondence
(quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974))); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
507 (1986) (“[C]ourts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities . . . .”).
18. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1221 (11th ed. 2004).
19. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63 (rev. ed. 1969) (“[C]larity represents
one of the most essential ingredients of legality.”); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 212–19 (1979) (discussing the
importance of openness, clarity, and stability in the law); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court,
2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 4041 (2005) (discussing legal
norms that usually guide judicial decision making); cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory
Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 190911 (2011)
(questioning whether principles of statutory interpretation enjoy the status of law).
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deference determinations get to the heart of that question.20 Regrettably,
the Court has never tried to address these determinations systematically. Not
only is deference so “important and . . . omnipresent” that it deserves a
“sincere effort to craft a principled doctrine,”21 but lower courts also have
great difficulty following the Supreme Court’s muddled guidance.
Through its discussion of deference determinations, this Article also
illuminates the problem of stealth constitutional decision making more
generally. Given that stealth determinations not only recur frequently but
also can be outcome determinative, their importance rivals that of
substantive black-letter doctrine, which is articulated in the tiers of scrutiny
and other tests courts apply in areas like standing and the Commerce
Clause.22 But stealth determinations are not treated like full doctrine, as the
Court’s pronouncements rarely carry precedential force. To be sure, this
malleability and unpredictability is symptomatic of more general problems
in constitutional jurisprudence,23 but the problem is heightened when the
Court makes these extra-doctrinal determinations.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses three different contexts
in which varied, but related, forms of institutional deference arise: deference
to congressional fact-finding; deference based on an administrative agency’s
ostensibly superior epistemic or political authority; and deference to special
government institutions, like prisons, or in special areas, like national
security. The Court’s approach to deference in each of these circumstances
is incomplete and inconsistent, raising difficult questions about how
deference determinations interact with doctrinal tests and whether stealth
determinations of this sort even enjoy the status of law. Part II argues that
courts should approach deference determinations by considering each
20. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF
RIGHTS 162 (2001) (“Constitutional law raises the central issue of who decides who decides.”).
21. William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Factfinding in Rights-Enforcing and RightsLimiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2064890.
22. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner Broad. I ), 512 U.S. 622, 641–42
(1994) (declaring that content-discriminatory speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992) (identifying injury, causation, and
redressability as the elements of Article III standing); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 49394 (1989) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that any discrimination based on race
triggers strict scrutiny); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 30102 (1964) (applying the
“substantial effects” test to find that Congress did have authority under the Commerce Clause
to pass the Civil Rights Act).
23. See generally ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT
AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES, at ix (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
constitutional decisions “reflect the personal values of the Justices”); Ray Forrester, Supreme
Court Opinions—Style and Substance: An Appeal for Reform, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 182–84 (1995)
(criticizing justices for pretending that their value judgments are in fact legal judgments);
Posner, supra note 19, at 39–54 (arguing that because the Supreme Court evaluates the
Constitution, it is necessarily a political decision maker).
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institution’s actual behavior in a particular case before determining whether
it deserves deference, rather than relying on generalizations about each
institution’s strengths and weaknesses. Part III considers advantages of and
challenges to this approach. The Article concludes with broader
observations about the Supreme Court’s failure to adequately theorize many
stealth determinations.
I.

STEALTH DEFERENCE DETERMINATIONS

A. THREE BRANCHES OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND
“SPECIAL” CONTEXTS
1. Deference to Congressional Factual Findings
One form of institutional deference in constitutional cases is judicial
respect for congressional fact-findings. In constitutional cases, the Supreme
Court must sometimes decide whether to accept the legislature’s
presentation of facts or whether it should instead draw its own factual
conclusions, on the basis of a trial court record, amicus briefs, or simply its
own understanding of the world. This determination is institutional insofar
as it sometimes rests on the Court’s perceptions of Congress’s relative
institutional strengths.24 Unlike courts, Congress can hold hearings, conduct
investigations, and create committees to examine issues.25 Collectively, these
abilities give Congress a fact-finding capacity that courts lack, and
presumably offer courts a sound reason to defer to Congress’s findings.
As with many varieties of deference, however, the Court’s method for
determining when to defer to congressional factual findings lacks
consistency.26 The Court claims to give “considerable deference, in
examining the evidence, to Congress’ findings and conclusions,”27 but it was
24. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner Broad. II ), 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (“We
owe Congress’ findings deference in part because the institution ‘is far better equipped than
the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon’ legislative
questions.” (quoting Turner Broad. I, 512 U.S. at 665–66 (plurality opinion)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308–09 (1966)
(deferring to Congress in part because it held extensive hearings and received testimony from
numerous witnesses).
25. See Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. the Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to
Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337, 363–
67 (1984).
26. See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS, at xii (2008) (referring to fact-finding in constitutional cases as a
“slapdash affair”); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84
IND. L.J. 1, 13–16 (2009) (discussing courts’ inconsistent treatment of legislative fact-finding).
27. Turner Broad. II, 520 U.S. at 199; see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 569,
579–81 (1990) (arguing that courts “must pay close attention to . . . the factfinding of
Congress” and “give ‘great weight to the decisions of Congress’” (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973))).
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hardly deferential when it struck down the Violence Against Women Act
(“VAWA”) in United States v. Morrison.28 When Congress enacted VAWA in
1994, it supported the legislation with voluminous findings detailing the
effects of violence against women on interstate commerce, including
deterring victims from traveling interstate, transacting business, and
engaging in employment.29 Congress seemed wise to include such findings,
given that just one year later the Court would point to the absence of such
legislative findings when it invalidated the Gun Free School Zone Act as
beyond Congress’s commerce power in United States v. Lopez.30 Nevertheless,
despite Congress’s inclusion of such findings in VAWA, the Court still
concluded that VAWA exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority,31
cautioning that “the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by
itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.”32
Indeed, the Court determined that Congress’s findings in VAWA were
“substantially weakened by the fact that they rely so heavily on a method of
reasoning that [the Court had] already rejected.”33 More specifically, the
Court rejected Congress’s findings because they might “completely
obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local
authority.”34
Most striking about this reasoning is that the Court attacked not so
much the methodology or veracity of the findings, but their constitutional
implications. The Court did not contend that Congress had used improper
methods to find, for instance, that gender-motivated violence deterred
victims from engaging in employment in interstate business. Nor did it
retreat from its contention in Lopez that congressional findings were relevant
to the commerce analysis, or contradict Congress’s ultimate conclusion that
gender-motivated violence collectively might have national economic
consequences. Rather, the Court contended that the findings “would allow
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact
of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or
consumption.”35 Congress’s findings were “substantially weakened,” then,
28. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
29. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1801, 1853.
30. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (faulting Congress for not
including findings “regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a
school zone” (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 5–6, Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (No. 93-1260))).
31. The government had sought to uphold the legislation under both the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619. The Court
rejected both arguments. See id. at 618–19, 627.
32. Id. at 614.
33. Id. at 615.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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because they would have authorized a broad national power that five justices
were unwilling to permit.36 The Court, in short, purported to reject
Congress’s findings, but in reality rejected the constitutional conclusions
that flowed from those findings.
Regardless of whether this is wise federalism doctrine, the Court’s
analysis failed to offer any method for how it should approach congressional
findings, especially findings with powerful constitutional implications. The
Court’s real attack appears to be on the “substantial effects” doctrine, which
purportedly permits Congress to regulate matters substantially affecting
interstate commerce.37 It could well be that activity that did not
“substantially affect” interstate commerce in 1788, such as violence against
women, does “substantially affect” it today.38 If so, then the “substantial
effects” test, at least as applied pre-Lopez and Morrison, would likely broaden
congressional power significantly beyond its original scope, because some
activity that did not substantially affect interstate commerce in the late
eighteenth century now does.39
But rather than suggesting that the “substantial effects” test be replaced
with a test yielding less congressional power, the Court faulted Congress’s
findings. Such judicial sleight of hand is regrettable. It is true, of course, that
questions of law and fact often blur together, but the Court’s explicit
repudiation of Congress’s factual findings indicates that the Court will not
accept factual findings yielding unpalatable constitutional results. The
Court, however, offered no roadmap for lower courts or litigants to follow
when assessing congressional findings.
Comparing two cases that address the same constitutional issue further
highlights the Court’s erratic approach to congressional findings. Congress
has authority to abrogate (i.e., to strip) a state’s Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,40 but
cannot do so using its Commerce Clause power.41 Accordingly, whether
Congress has properly abrogated state sovereign immunity in a given
statutory scheme usually hinges on whether it has properly exercised its
Section 5 power—that is, whether the abrogation is “congruent and

36. See Araiza, supra note 21, at 17 & n.74 (arguing that Morrison disallowed “a role for
congressional findings”).
37. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548, 559 (1995).
38. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT.
REV. 125, 129–30 (“As commerce today seems plainly to reach practically every activity of social
life, it would seem to follow that Congress has the power to reach, through regulation,
practically every activity of social life.”).
39. See id.
40. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
41. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996).

A1_BERGER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

DEFERENCE DETERMINATIONS

12/19/2012 11:05 AM

475

proportional” to the targeted violation Congress sought to remedy.42 Often,
to determine whether a particular abrogation was appropriately “congruent
and proportional,” the Court looks to Congress’s factual record supporting
the legislation. Once again, the Court’s approach to these findings is
inconsistent.
In Garrett, the Court determined that Congress had overreached in
permitting state employees to recover money damages from state employers
who had failed to comply with provisions of the ADA.43 Congress held
thirteen separate hearings on these issues and found that “historically,
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and,
despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem.”44 The Court, however, dismissed the relevance of these findings,
insisting that to abrogate state sovereign immunity, Congress needed not
general evidence of discrimination against the disabled but evidence of such
discrimination by states themselves.45 Despite some such evidence in the
legislative record, the Court found that the incidents compiled fell “far short
of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which
§ 5 legislation must be based.”46
Indeed, the Court used Congress’s limited findings to help justify
striking down the abrogation, noting that Congress had found that 43
million Americans have some disability and that states employ 4.5 million
people.47 Given these large numbers, the Court found it “telling” that
“Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state
discrimination in employment against the disabled.”48 The Court so held
even though Congress probably could not have known such specific
documentation would be required, given that the ADA was passed in 1990—
before Boerne’s 1997 “congruent and proportional” requirement. The Court
further refused to accept findings about state discrimination against the
42. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
43. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
44. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (2003).
45. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369 (“[T]he great majority of these incidents [compiled by
Congress] do not deal with the activities of States.”); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 90–91 (2000) (“Although we also have doubts whether the findings Congress did make
with respect to the private sector could be extrapolated to support a finding of unconstitutional
age discrimination in the public sector, it is sufficient for these cases to note that Congress
failed to identify a widespread pattern of age discrimination by the States.” (emphasis
omitted)).
46. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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disabled unless they pertained specifically to employment and reflected the
policies of the state (as opposed to state sub-divisions, like cities and
counties).49
However, though the Court followed this undeferential approach in
other abrogation cases,50 it has sometimes accorded far more respect to
congressional findings. For example, in Hibbs the Court was decidedly more
deferential when it upheld the FMLA’s abrogation of state sovereign
immunity. The Court highlighted the importance of congressional findings,
indicating that Congress had found sufficient evidence that state laws
limited women’s employment opportunities and reinforced gender
stereotypes, thus “justif[ying] Congress’ passage of prophylactic § 5
legislation.”51 More specifically, the Court cited the FMLA’s legislative
record, which reflected “that 37 percent of surveyed private-sector
employees were covered by maternity leave policies, while only 18 percent
were covered by paternity leave policies.”52
These numbers certainly reflect gender-based stereotypes, but the
Court’s reliance on them suggests far more deference than Garrett. Whereas
Garrett specifically faulted Congress for failing to identify enough instances
of state discrimination against the disabled,53 Hibbs drew on evidence largely
from the private sector to conclude that abrogation was appropriate,
because “stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation of family duties
remained firmly rooted.”54 The Court, to its credit, also identified some
public-sector evidence before Congress, but, as Professor Robert Post points
out, collectively Congress’s record supporting the FMLA was “far weaker”
than the record deemed insubstantial in Garrett.55 Indeed, the dissenting
justices in Hibbs were skeptical, contending that the majority should have

49. See id. at 368–69, 371 n.7 (rejecting relevance of discrimination by local governments
and other findings because “[o]nly a small fraction” of them “relate to state discrimination
against the disabled in employment”).
50. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90–91 (finding Congress’s report insufficient to establish a
“significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640–48 (1999) (concluding, after extensive
review, that “Congress came up with little evidence” supporting the propriety of its Section 5
legislation).
51. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003).
52. Id.
53. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
54. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730.
55. Post, supra note 44, at 16. Indeed, much of the important public-sector evidence in
Hibbs was relegated to a footnote. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 n.3 (briefly summarizing a fifty-state
survey demonstrating similarities between public- and private-sector leave policies). The Court
also vaguely cited evidence indicating that even non-facially discriminatory laws “were applied
in discriminatory ways,” citing not compiled statistics, but a House Report and testimony of one
witness in Senate labor hearings. See id. at 732.
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relied on more than merely “a simple recitation of a general history of
employment discrimination against women.”56
To be clear, the evidence in Hibbs may well suggest a substantial enough
pattern of discrimination to justify abrogating state sovereign immunity.57
But the Court never addressed why the congressional facts in Hibbs were
sufficient while the facts in Garrett were not.58 The Garrett Court, for instance,
rejected approximately 300 examples of discrimination by state
governments in the legislative record,59 because those examples “were
submitted not directly to Congress” but to a congressionally appointed task
force.60 The Court never explained why this distinction should be relevant to
the deference determination, or why, in light of precedent, Congress’s view
of the facts should not be given the benefit of the doubt.61
Garrett also rejected other evidence of “adverse, disparate treatment by
state officials”62 because it was merely “anecdotal.”63 The Court, however,
failed to address whether evidence of disability discrimination will usually be
anecdotal, since such discrimination typically would not be explicit in a
state’s policies. By contrast, in the FMLA setting, Congress could more easily
examine a state’s written leave policies to identify sex discrimination.
Perhaps anecdotal evidence is never to be trusted, but if that is the case, the
Court’s approach makes it difficult for Congress ever to amass a sufficient
record of certain kinds of discrimination. Significantly, the Court neither
fully acknowledges nor justifies its decision to set such a high bar for
Congress in certain kinds of discrimination cases.
There are, of course, other factors that can explain the different
outcomes in Garrett and Hibbs. Whereas the FMLA addressed sex
discrimination, which triggers intermediate scrutiny under the Constitution,
the ADA addressed disability discrimination, which only triggers rational
basis review and therefore requires that Congress show a “widespread

56. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 746 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 735 (majority opinion).
58. See Post, supra note 44, at 16 (arguing that, measured by the standards of Garrett, “the
legislative record in Hibbs was virtually barren of specific allegations or examples of relevant
unconstitutional state discrimination”).
59. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 379 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
60. See id. at 370–71 (majority opinion).
61. See id. at 382–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“‘[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain’ challenged legislation, then ‘there is a presumption of the
existence of that state of facts, and one who assails the classification must carry the burden of
showing . . . that the [congressional] action is arbitrary.’” (quoting Pac. States Box & Basket Co.
v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935))).
62. Id. at 370 (majority opinion) (quoting id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
63. Id.
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pattern” of state discrimination.64 Given that it is easier to assert a successful
sex-discrimination claim, legislation passed to remedy such discrimination is
more likely to be “congruent and proportionate” to the underlying
violation.65 However, while these distinctions may adequately account for the
different outcomes in the cases, they do not fully explain the Court’s
inconsistent consideration of congressional findings. Indeed, even if we
agree that the Court appropriately demanded a more widespread pattern of
discrimination in Garrett, that view still would not explain the Court’s
rejection of the facts that Congress did gather to support the ADA.
The Court’s failure to adequately explain, let alone theorize, its
approach to legislative fact-finding is so pervasive that at times it is not even
clear within a single case whether it is deferring or not. In Gonzales v.
Carhart, the Court upheld Congress’s Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, which
prohibited certain abortion procedures.66 The Court perfunctorily
reiterated the deference it usually accords congressional findings,67 but then
asserted that Congress’s findings supporting the statute in question had
included factual inaccuracies.68 Therefore, the Court explained, “Uncritical
deference to Congress’ factual findings in these cases is inappropriate.”69
Nevertheless, despite the inaccuracies, the Court, relying largely on
Congress’s factual record, proceeded to conclude, contrary to the trial
court’s findings, that the medical community was evenly divided as to
whether the banned abortion procedure was sometimes the safest for
particular women.70 As Professor Borgmann argues, “[T]he Court purported
not to defer to Congress’s fact-finding, but its upholding of the federal
abortion procedure ban was possible only because the Court in fact did
implicitly defer to Congress on the key medical facts in dispute.”71 Indeed,
the Court in Gonzales is remarkably both critical of and deferential to
Congress’s factual findings within just a few sentences.72 Compounding the
confusion, the Court also does not explain sufficiently why Congress’s
findings deserved respect while the Nebraska legislature’s similar findings

64. Compare Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. V. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728, 735–36 (2003), with
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366–67.
65. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
66. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
67. See id. at 165 (“[W]e review congressional factfinding under a deferential standard.”).
68. See id. (explaining that some of Congress’s findings were “factually incorrect”).
69. Id. at 166.
70. See Borgmann, supra note 26, at 28.
71. Id. at 15.
72. FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 114.
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on the same matter had commanded so little respect just seven years earlier
in Stenberg v. Carhart.73
Even this brief survey illustrates that the Court’s approach to
congressional fact-finding is both inconsistent and inadequately theorized.
Perhaps most strikingly absent is a careful analysis of why some legislative
findings are worthy of respect while others are not. Similarly absent is a
discussion of whether some findings are more “factual,” whereas others
merely assert the constitutional conclusion the legislature desires. The result
is confusion.
2. Deference to Agency Action
The Court’s approach to deference is similarly erratic where
congressional action is not directly at issue.74 Courts often defer to
administrative agencies because of their epistemic or political authority.75
While these rationales may subtly underlie deference to congressional
factual findings as well,76 it is also an independent reason when courts review
agency action in constitutional cases.77
a.

Deference to Agency Epistemic Authority

Administrative agencies’ primary institutional advantage is subjectmatter expertise. Unlike legislatures, agencies administer policy within a
limited area and employ expert, professional staff.78 Indeed, the common
wisdom is that agencies exist because they are institutionally situated to

73. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937–38 (2000) (finding insufficient evidence to
support the assertion that a health exception to Nebraska’s abortion law was medically
necessary, despite the state legislature’s apparent findings to the contrary).
74. See generally Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2038–54 (discussing the
Court’s inconsistent approach to deference in individual rights cases involving administrative
agencies).
75. Courts have better fleshed out deference in administrative law cases, but even in
constitutional cases, judicial deference can be predicated on epistemic authority. The author
argues elsewhere that the administrative law norms guiding the Court in those cases can also
help guide judicial deference in constitutional cases. See id. at 2054–79.
76. See Borgmann, supra note 26, at 19 (“The courts have sometimes tied Congress’s
allegedly superior competence to certain fact-finding contexts.”).
77. This discussion focuses on cases in which the Court must determine whether an
agency has violated the Constitution and therefore puts to the side issues that might obstruct a
ruling on the merits, such as immunity, standing, and exhaustion doctrines. It also does not
consider procedural due process cases, in which the agency’s procedural shortcomings
themselves can amount to a constitutional violation. See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra
note 12, at 2033–34, 2038–47, 2067–70.
78. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 135 (2d ed.
2002) (describing agencies’ expert staff).
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provide an expertise and focus that legislatures cannot.79 In practice,
however, not all agencies possess this presumed proficiency over all the
subjects before them, and the Court is not always as sensitive as it should be
to variations in agency competence.
Baze v. Rees provides a helpful example.80 The Baze plaintiffs argued that
Kentucky’s lethal injection procedure created a substantial risk of
excruciating pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against “cruel and unusual punishment.”81 In rejecting the plaintiffs’
challenge, the plurality emphasized that judicial intervention would be
inappropriate because the relevant Kentucky officials possessed a certain
epistemic authority that the judiciary lacked.82
While Baze’s attention to the relative expertise of the Kentucky
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) is certainly appropriate, closer
inspection calls into serious question the plurality’s assumptions about the
agency’s actual expertise in this case. In failing to question whether the
DOC’s supposed epistemic authority was deserving of deference, the Court
incorrectly assumed that the administrative officials designed and
implemented the procedures with some degree of expertise and
professionalism.83 As some lower courts have recognized, though, many
states have adopted lethal injection procedures with neither.84 Indeed, at the
time Baze was decided, many states’ procedures, including Kentucky’s, were
executed in secret by prison guards lacking a basic understanding of the
drugs they were administering.85 In Kentucky’s case, the execution team
even lacked appropriate training about the drugs’ potential to cause

79. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 12–29 (1985)
(explaining that much of the impetus for the creation of administrative agencies is the desire
for expert rather than lay or political judgment).
80. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion). Consistent with Court precedent,
this Article treats Chief Justice Roberts’ Baze plurality opinion as the Court’s holding. See, e.g.,
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976) (plurality opinion))).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 (plurality opinion).
82. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 51 (noting that judicial intervention “would embroil the courts in
ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise”).
83. See id. (noting states’ scientific expertise).
84. See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (describing
California’s “pervasive lack of professionalism” with regards to administering its lethal injection
procedure); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035, at *3–6 (W.D. Mo.
June 26, 2006) (describing Missouri’s failure to carefully design lethal injection procedure).
85. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 74–75 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he drugs were selected by
unelected Department of Correction officials with no specialized medical knowledge and
without the benefit of expert assistance or guidance.”).
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excruciating pain.86 The plurality, then, deferred without considering
whether the state agency possessed the very expertise that was the grounds
for deference in the first place.87
Baze may be an especially egregious example of the Court deferring on
undeserved epistemic grounds, but it is hardly anomalous. To the contrary,
the Court often reflexively defers to administrative agents in constitutional
cases based on those agents’ ostensible expertise.88 Of course, deference in
such cases may be justified if the agency has particular expertise over the
subject matter at issue. However, as in Baze, the Court often assumes such
expertise without further inquiry.89
Further complicating the picture is the fact that the Court sometimes
reviews more rigorously a constitutional challenge precisely because an
agency appears to have been acting without expertise. In other words, the
Court sometimes refuses to defer to an agency for epistemic failures similar
to the ones it ignored in Baze. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, for instance, the
Court struck down a provision in Civil Service Commission Regulations that
forbade the employment of legal alien residents partially because the agency
had not made adequate use of its expertise.90 Five Chinese legal resident
aliens sued the Commission after they were denied federal government jobs
for which they were qualified, because they were not United States citizens,91
contending that the regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause.92
In ruling for the plaintiffs, the Court explained that “[t]he Civil Service
Commission, like other administrative agencies, has an obligation to
perform its responsibilities with some degree of expertise, and to make
known the reasons for its important decisions.”93 The Court was
unimpressed with the Commission’s performance, noting that “[t]here is
nothing in the record before us . . . to indicate that the Commission actually
made any considered evaluation of the relative desirability of a simple
exclusionary rule on the one hand, or the value to the service of enlarging

86. See id. at 73–75.
87. See Berger, Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 59–65 (discussing Baze’s failure to
consider problems with state administration of lethal injection); Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and
the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 259, 263–72, 283–86, 301–14
(2009) [hereinafter Berger, Lethal Injection] (discussing problems in lethal injection procedures
that the Baze Court ignored).
88. See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2040–47, 2084–91 (discussing
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
89. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218–19 (deferring to military judgment that it was
impossible to separate loyal from disloyal Japanese Americans despite evidence to the contrary).
90. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 115–17 (1976).
91. Id. at 91–93.
92. Id. at 96.
93. Id. at 115.
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the pool of eligible employees on the other.”94 That is, the Commission had
not diligently made use of its expertise in crafting the regulation. Had the
Court in Baze similarly asked whether the DOC utilized its expertise, it surely
could not have deferred on epistemic grounds.
Baze and Mow Sun Wong, obviously, involved numerous factors,95 and
certainly such different cases about different constitutional provisions
should not be approached identically.96 Nevertheless, the Court’s divergent
approaches to deferring to agencies on epistemic grounds are hard to
square. Regardless of which approach is preferable, neither provides
adequate insight into why or how the Court made its determination.
b.

Deference to Agency Political Authority

The Court also sometimes premises deference to agencies on their
political authority.97 At first glance, such deference is curious. Unlike elected
legislatures and chief executives, many administrative agents are unelected
and are not directly answerable to the people. Elected legislators may be less
representative than many of us would like to think,98 but, by virtue of their
election, they are nonetheless more politically responsive than unelected
federal judges.99 By contrast, agencies’ political accountability is, at best,
indirect.100 It is true that administrative agencies reside within the “political”

94. Id.
95. See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2038–40, 2047–49, 2052–53.
96. One obvious distinction between the cases is that Baze challenged state administrative
action, whereas Mow Sun Wong challenged federal agency action. The Court, however, does not
indicate in either opinion that this distinction should militate for different review. Indeed,
given that the substantive constitutional provisions at issue (the Eighth Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause) apply with the same force to both federal and state governments, that
distinction seems inadequate to explain the discrepancy. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Our action today makes explicit [that f]ederal racial
classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be
narrowly tailored to further that interest.”); Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at
2077–79.
97. Judicial deference to congressional fact-finding also rests partially on politicalauthority grounds. See supra Part I.A.1.
98. See Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability, and the Democratic
Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 45, 47–48 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
99. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 17, 19–21 (1962).
100. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and
it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices . . . .”).
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(that is, nonjudicial) branches of government, but structural location alone
should not confer democratic legitimacy upon an institution.101
Given courts’ great anxiety that judicial review is countermajoritarian,102 it is surprising they would casually conflate elected officials
with unelected administrative agents here.103 Nevertheless, the Court
sometimes does exactly that, granting agencies deference on their supposed
political authority.104 Once again, though, its approach is inconsistent.
Baze and Mow Sun Wong again provide an illuminating contrast. As
noted above, the lethal injection procedures in Baze were designed and
implemented by the Kentucky DOC.105 The Baze plurality declined to subject
the challenged execution procedure to rigorous review, arguing that doing
so “would substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in
implementing their execution procedures.”106 Courts, Baze thus indicated,
had no business interfering with democratically elected legislatures, whose
political authority far exceeded courts’.107
Baze, however, rested on a false assumption about whose policy was at
issue. Contrary to the Chief Justice’s suggestion, the Kentucky legislature
had little to do with the State’s lethal injection procedure. The Chief Justice,
in other words, conflated administrative and legislative action. In most states
with capital punishment, including Kentucky, the state legislature delegates
the lethal injection procedure to DOC officials, who typically design the
procedures and instruct prison guards or independent contractors to
execute them.108 Lethal injection suits, like Baze, do not challenge lethal
injection per se, but rather the details of the procedure as designed and
implemented by the agency. The plurality, nonetheless, deferred to the state
legislature’s political authority, even though the unelected DOC officials
actually responsible for the procedure’s details did not enjoy such
democratic legitimacy. Of course, the legislative delegation may demonstrate
democratic support for the death penalty and lethal injection generally, but

101. Cf. STRAUSS, supra note 78, at 127–35 (discussing different kinds of administrative
agencies).
102. See generally BICKEL, supra note 99, at 16–23.
103. See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2032 (“[I]t is strange that the
Court would defer reflexively to unaccountable administrative agents without inquiring into
their underlying democratic legitimacy.”).
104. See id. at 2038–47.
105. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (plurality opinion).
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See Berger, Lethal Injection, supra note 87, at 302–03 (discussing delegation of lethal
injection procedures); Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling
Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 63, 116–25 (2002) (same).
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that general support does not necessarily translate into support for the
challenged execution procedure’s details.
Real attention to questions of political authority in Baze would have
more precisely examined the procedure’s details, as opposed to capital
punishment or lethal injection generally. Doing so would have resulted in
assessing the actual democratic legitimacy of the DOC. Baze’s analysis was
not so nuanced, summarily treating an administrative agency as though it
had the same democratic legitimacy as the state legislature. Kentucky’s lethal
injection procedure may not have created great enough risk of pain to
violate the Eighth Amendment, but given the state legislature’s abdication of
authority over the procedure’s details, Baze’s explicit deference to the
political authority of the legislature was misplaced.
Mow Sun Wong’s approach to these matters again provides a helpful
counterpoint. Whereas Baze offered an administrative agency deference
based on an illusory democratic legitimacy, Mow Sun Wong refused
deference to an agency precisely because it lacked the same political
authority that elected legislatures and chief executives enjoy. In ruling for
the plaintiffs, the Court emphasized that it was “perfectly clear that neither
Congress nor the President has ever required the Civil Service Commission to
adopt the citizenship requirement as a condition of eligibility for
employment in the federal civil service.”109 The Court struck down the
policy,110 explaining that the outcome may very well have been different had
Congress or the President erected the challenged policy but that an
administrative agency like the Civil Service Commission could not itself
design policies raising serious constitutional concerns given its lack of
political accountability.111
The Court therefore reviewed the employment rule more stringently
precisely because it came not from an elected body but from an unelected
agency. As Professor Sunstein summarized, Mow Sun Wong turned “on the
idea that publicly accountable bodies should make the contested decision
that was challenged.”112 Thus, whereas Baze deferred to the state agency as
though it were the legislature, Mow Sun Wong gave heightened review
precisely because an agency rather than the legislature was acting.113 Much
109. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105 (1976).
110. Id. at 116–17.
111. Id. at 103–05.
112. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 48 (1996).
113. Though the Court might have opposed the delegation particularly in the immigration
context because Congress enjoys plenary power over immigration, it does not appear to have
made that argument, perhaps because congressional plenary power over immigration has
eroded as Congress increasingly has delegated immigration policy to executive officials. See
Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 466
(2009).
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more could be said to try to reconcile these discrepancies,114 but taken
together they point to a judicial analysis of deference that is wanting and
inconsistent.
3. Deference to Special Government Institutions and in Special Contexts
The Court also sometimes extends considerable deference to particular
governmental institutions, such as prisons, or in particular substantive areas,
such as national security. The Court appears to treat deference in these
areas as especially deserved and beyond what it would ordinarily accord on
epistemic or political grounds. On closer look, however, this deference also
is haphazard and under-examined.
a.

Prisons as Special Government Institutions

The common wisdom is that the Court often defers to prisons,115
suggesting that prisons are somehow a special institution deserving of
heightened deference. Though there is substantial truth to this narrative,
upon closer examination, deference to prisons is less consistent and
explicated than one might expect. For example, Turner v. Safley116 is often
cited for the Court’s deferential rational basis review of prison policies.117
The Court there noted the peculiar institutional difficulties confronting
prison officials, emphasizing that “[r]unning a prison is an inordinately
difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment
of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative
and executive branches of government.”118
Even Turner itself, however, demonstrates that deference in the prison
context is more complicated than its own language might suggest. In Turner,
the Court upheld a policy prohibiting inmate-to-inmate correspondence
while striking down a policy prohibiting inmates from marrying absent the

114. See supra note 96.
115. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“[C]ourts have been especially deferential to prison authorities ‘in the adoption and execution
of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547
(1979))); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (“[F]ederal courts have adopted
a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration. . . . [T]he problems of
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily
susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the
commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and
executive branches of government.”), overruled in part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 501
(1989).
116. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
117. See Ozan O. Varol, Strict in Theory, but Accommodating in Fact?, 75 MO. L. REV. 1243,
1284 (2010) (noting Turner’s “deferential standard of review to prison officials”).
118. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–85.
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prison superintendent finding “compelling reasons.”119 Curiously, the Court
failed to explain why the institutional pressures which usually militated for
deference to prisons did not apply to the marriage regulation.120 It could
have resolved the apparent discrepancy by focusing on the fact that marriage
is a fundamental right triggering heightened scrutiny, but it did not do that
either.121 One of the best known cases about deference to prisons, then,
does not even consistently follow the rule it purports to announce.
Turner-style deference is, thus, hardly absolute. In Johnson v. California,
for example, the Court applied strict scrutiny to racial segregation in
prisons, expressly foregoing the deferential Turner standard.122 In other
words, the relevant tier of scrutiny sometimes trumps deference
considerations, even though the Court has said that prison regulations
allegedly infringing “constitutional rights are judged under a
‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged
infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.”123 This less demanding
approach can also extend to court-imposed remedies. While courts today are
less likely to impose structural reform injunctions on prisons with poor
conditions than they were several decades ago,124 the Court in Brown v. Plata
upheld an affirmative remedial order requiring California to reduce its
prison population within two years.125 The extreme facts in Plata may well
justify the judicial intrusion,126 but a remedial order mandating a reduction
in prison population hardly suggests judicial deference. Cases like Plata,
Johnson, and, indeed, Turner itself, therefore belie the oversimplified
assertion that the Court always defers to prisons.
What is striking in all these cases is not just the Court’s inconsistent
approach, but its failure to decide whether prisons are, in fact, a special kind

119. Id. at 82–91.
120. See id.; Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2046–47.
121. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 97 (“[E]ven under the reasonable relationship test, the
marriage regulation does not withstand scrutiny.”).
122. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (“We have never applied Turner to
racial classifications.”).
123. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); see also infra Part I.B.
124. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (upholding the district court’s
remedy in a prison conditions case in which the trial court had found problems stemming from
“the inmates’ diet, the continued overcrowding, the rampant violence, the vandalized cells, and
the ‘lack of professionalism and good judgment on the part of maximum security personnel’”
(quoting Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 277 (E.D. Ark. 1976), aff’d, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir.
1977), aff’d, Hutto, 437 U.S. 678)); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 39–50
(1998) (discussing the “full stride” of the prison litigation reform movement and the
subsequent retreat of that reform movement).
125. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1945–47 (2011).
126. See id. at 1923–24 (noting that California’s “prisons had operated at around 200% of
design capacity for at least 11 years”).
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of institution deserving a special kind of deference. Turner justified its
deference, for instance, by emphasizing the government’s superior expertise
in both running prisons and allocating scarce resources.127 However
persuasive these arguments may be, they do not seem unique to the prison
context. In many areas, the political branches presumably understand better
than courts the difficulties associated with administration and budget
constraints. Though the Court’s language suggests that prisons receive
special deference,128 it is not clear whether prisons’ peculiar administrative
challenges militate for a consistent rule of deference unique to prisons or,
instead, reflect a general judicial deference that often, but not always,
applies to governmental endeavors. In short, we are left with the sense that
the rules for prisons are different, but we are not quite certain precisely why,
how, or when.129
b.

The Special Context of National Security

Similarly confusing is the Court’s deference that often applies in
matters concerning national security.130 This deference is institution-based
insofar as the Court assumes that its facility with national-security issues is
inferior to the institution whose policy is under review. However, while this
deference may be more consistent than in the prison context, it is
nonetheless insufficiently theorized across various national-security
settings.131 Indeed, even in cases solely involving the military (and not the

127. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (noting that “[w]here a state penal system
is involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate
prison authorities” due to those authorities’ “expertise, planning, and the commitment of
resources”).
128. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
129. Of course, the federal courts confront a great deal of prison litigation, the sheer
volume of which may also incline judges to defer to prison officials. See Mariah L. Passarelli,
Broken Gate? A Study of the PLRA Exhaustion Requirement: Past, Present, and Future, 47 CRIM. L.
BULL. 95, 99–100 (2011) (discussing the enormous increase in prison litigation in the decades
prior to the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996). For good reason, though, the
Court has not premised its special deference to prisons on this basis.
130. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (“That
evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’s assessment, is entitled to deference.
This litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign
affairs.”); Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2009)
(“Should judges defer to factual judgments made by the executive branch in litigation involving
national security? The executive branch frequently argues that judges should do precisely that,
and though courts often express reservations, they often comply in the end.”). Deference in
national-security cases, of course, is a vast subject that could easily consume an entire article,
but a cursory look at some relevant cases can help illustrate the Court’s inconsistency. See
generally Chesney, supra.
131. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 130, at 1366 (“[L]itigants and judges lack a shared
understanding of the nature of [national-security deference] claims and of the arguments that
are relevant to resolving them.”); John Nelson Ohlweiler, The Principle of Deference: Facial
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other several agencies charged with protecting national security), courts
utilize a range of approaches to deference.132
This inconsistency is evident even if we just consider two prominent
national-security cases decided since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (“HLP ”), the Court followed its
usual deferential approach, upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which prohibits
the provision of “material support or resources” to foreign organizations
engaging in terrorist activity, including speech facilitating only lawful, nonviolent purposes of such groups.133 In rejecting the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment challenge, the Court emphasized Congress’s findings that
“[f]oreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by
their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization
facilitates that conduct.”134 The Court also cited the State Department’s
related findings “that ‘[t]he experience and analysis of the U.S. government
agencies charged with combating terrorism strongly suppor[t]’ Congress’s
finding that all contributions to foreign terrorist organizations further their
terrorism.”135 The Court thus deferred to these legislative and executive
findings that foreign terrorist organizations did not meaningfully segregate
their support for legitimate activities from their support for terrorism, and,
consequently, that the ban on material support in the form of speech to
designated organizations was necessary to serve the government’s interest in
preventing terrorism.136
In noting that the “sensitive and weighty interests of national security
and foreign affairs” merited special concession,137 the HLP Court was not
merely deferring out of respect for the political branches’ expertise and
democratic legitimacy, but instead based on unique concerns arising in the
national-security context.138 These concerns were apparently so powerful
that the Court neglected to even cite Brandenburg v. Ohio, the modern
Constitutional Challenges to Military Regulations, 10 J.L. & POL. 147, 149–50 (1993) (arguing that
the Supreme Court has never adequately described or explained its deference to the military).
132. See Steven B. Lichtman, The Justices and the Generals: A Critical Examination of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Tradition of Deference to the Military, 1918–2004, 65 MD. L. REV. 907, 929–37
(2006) (discussing courts’ different approaches to deference in cases involving conscientious
objectors, soldier pay disputes, courts-martial, tort liability, and the Japanese relocation
controversies).
133. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2712.
134. Id. at 2724 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247).
135. Id. at 2727 (alterations in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 133, Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 3877534, at *133).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. (“It is vital in this [national-security] context ‘not to substitute . . . our own
evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch.’” (quoting Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981))); id. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Court’s leading case on speech inciting illegal activity.139 In explaining this
special deference, however, the Court lazily reiterated the explanations it
offers in other institutional contexts. It emphasized the political branches’
relative epistemic authority with respect to national-security matters, noting
that “neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the
day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation
and its people”140 and that “when it comes to collecting evidence and
drawing factual inferences in this area, ‘the lack of competence on the part
of the courts is marked.’”141 Such respect, the Court explained, was
appropriate because “national security and foreign policy concerns arise in
connection with efforts to confront evolving threats in an area where
information can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct
difficult to assess.”142 On this reasoning, courts should not interfere with the
political branches on national-security matters because the epistemic divide
between the judiciary and the other branches is great and because the
information the political branches do have is difficult to gather and prone to
change.
While these explanations may offer sound reasons for judicial
deference, it is less clear that they warrant special deference in nationalsecurity cases. Courts’ relative epistemic shortcomings are always a reason
for deference; they are not unique to issues of national security. While the
government must enjoy flexibility to adapt to frequent changes in world
affairs, many other areas in which government operates are also complicated
and inconstant. Financial markets, for instance, change frequently, but it is
hard to believe that courts would defer to legislative and executive factfindings justifying limiting the speech of such market participants. Similarly,
while the fluidity of world events perhaps justifies permitting nationalsecurity officials to act without demonstrating the existence of “specific
facts,”143 epistemic uncertainty is hardly unique to the realm of national
security. It would be bizarre if courts relaxed otherwise applicable
constitutional doctrine, for instance, to protect officials trying to address
potential economic or environmental dangers. This is not necessarily to
argue that national security does not deserve special deference, but rather
that courts’ explanations do not adequately capture what may be different
about that area.
Perhaps because the judicial explanation for special national-security
deference is wanting, judicial application of such deference is inconsistent.
139. See id. at 2712–31 (majority opinion).
140. Id. at 2727 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65).
142. Id.
143. See id. at 2727–28.
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Whereas HLP reflected substantial deference, the post-September 11
executive detention cases reflect a decidedly less deferential Court.144 In
Boumediene v. Bush, for instance, the Court rejected the government’s
argument that Congress could constitutionally strip Guantanamo detainees
of the right to file petitions for habeas corpus in federal district court to
challenge the legality of their detention.145 The Court concluded that
habeas jurisdiction extends to a military base over which the United States
enjoys de facto sovereignty and is not limited, as the government had
contended, to territories over which the country exercises de jure
sovereignty.146 In essence, the Court recognized that the United States
exercised all practical control over Guantanamo and therefore rejected the
government’s formalistic approach.147 The Court similarly rejected the
government’s argument that at common law habeas jurisdiction had not
extended to non-citizens where the country lacked de jure sovereignty,
because the historical evidence was inconclusive.148
Citing United States v. Curtiss–Wright Export Corp., the Court purported to
accord proper deference to the political branches,149 but it is hard to think
of Boumediene as deferential.150 As Justice Scalia argued in dissent, the
majority struck “a pose of faux deference to Congress and the President.”151
Had the Court been truly deferential, it might have crafted an HLP-like
opinion, emphasizing the dangers posed by terrorism, the government’s
relative institutional expertise in responding to those dangers, the burdens
placed on the executive by permitting detainees to challenge their
detention, and the government’s epistemic superiority in understanding the
history of executive detention. Such an approach may have inappropriately

144. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783 (“Where a person is detained by executive order . . .
the need for collateral review is most pressing.”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 640
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (affording less deference to the President’s
determination in an executive detention case); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004)
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he threats to military operations posed by a basic system of
independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge
meaningfully the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.”).
145. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781–85.
146. See id. at 764 (concluding that de jure sovereignty is not “the only relevant
consideration in determining the geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas corpus”).
147. Id. at 755.
148. Id. (finding “scant” historical support for the proposition “that de jure sovereignty is the
touchstone of habeas corpus jurisdiction”).
149. See id. at 796–97 (“In considering both the procedural and substantive standards used
to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the
political branches.” (citing United States v. Curtiss–Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936))).
150. It is easier, however, to think of Boumediene as ultimately relatively inconsequential. See
infra notes 299–302 and accompanying text.
151. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 830 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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denied the detainees access to federal court, but it would have been more
consistent with the Court’s precedent of deferring in national-security cases.
* * *
Notwithstanding the common wisdom that courts defer to the
government in prison and national-security cases, one can see that the
reality is more complicated and lacks a clear justification for providing
heightened deference in these contexts. Though the Court appears to grant
special deference in these contexts, its bases for such deference are
reminiscent of rationales it invokes in more conventional settings.152 These
rationales make sense—but only to a point. We expect, for instance, that the
State Department and the CIA will better understand national-security
threats than the judiciary. But, as discussed above, presumptions about the
government’s expertise are not always credible. As Justice Breyer argued in
his HLP dissent, the record in that case provided little indication that
Congress utilized any genuine expertise when it passed the challenged
law.153 Moreover, even when government does act with genuine expertise,
that epistemic authority does not justify creating special categories of
deference; many governmental institutions unconnected to prisons or
national security possess expertise that courts lack.
In fairness, judicial deference on national-security issues is somewhat
better theorized than it is to prisons. In addition to epistemic arguments, the
Court also sometimes defers to the military on separation-of-powers
grounds, emphasizing that the Constitution expressly vests Congress and the
Executive with authority over military affairs.154 It also often explains that the
military is a separate community, subject to different rules than the rest of
society.155 However, while these arguments provide additional justification
for special deference to the military, they do not necessarily apply to the
152. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987) (citing prison officials’ expertise as
justification for deference); Ohlweiler, supra note 130, at 153 (explaining deference to the
military by “the perceived limits of judicial competence when dealing with the complexity of the
military establishment”); supra notes 116–18, 137–42 and accompanying text.
153. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2735 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“The Government has provided us with no empirical information that might
convincingly support this claim.”); supra Part I.A.2 (describing the Court’s deference to agency
action).
154. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (“It is clear that the Constitution
contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights, duties, and
responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including regulations,
procedures, and remedies related to military discipline . . . .”); Ohlweiler, supra note 131, at
152–53.
155. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (“[W]ithin the military
community there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there is in the larger civilian
community.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Ohlweiler, supra note 131, at 153.
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several other governmental entities tasked with protecting the national
security. Perhaps other rationales could justify heightened deference in
those other instances too, but the Court has yet to consistently provide any
such explanation.156
B. INTERACTIONS WITH THE TIERS OF SCRUTINY
Deference determinations, as conceptualized in this Article, are
institutional inquiries based on whether the relevant political actor’s
characteristics and behavior deserve presumptive respect from the judiciary.
They are, thus, distinct from substantive grounds for deference, such as the
tiers of scrutiny, which are rooted in black-letter constitutional doctrine.
Race-based discrimination in equal-protection cases and content-based
discrimination in free-speech cases, for instance, are both substantive factors
that trigger strict scrutiny, a very undeferential standard of review.
Institutional deference, in other words, is distinct from the tiers of scrutiny
(and other substantive doctrinal constitutional analysis), but the two kinds of
“deference” nevertheless interact in some cases.157
Accordingly, a discussion of deference in constitutional cases should
acknowledge the tiers of scrutiny, which often determine the level of rigor
with which the Court reviews the constitutionality of government actions.
While there may be many reasons to criticize the tiers of scrutiny,158 the
Court nevertheless usually purports to adhere to them, such as when it
determines whether a group is “suspect” for equal-protection purposes.159
The Court, however, has not fleshed out how “doctrinal deference” interacts
with “institutional deference” determinations. In other words, what should
guide the Court’s approach to deference in a case where the tier of scrutiny
dictated by constitutional doctrine does not align easily with the level of
deference suggested by institutional factors?160
156. See infra Part II.B.3.
157. See Araiza, supra note 21, at 19–20.
158. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 494–528
(2004) (discussing a number of flaws in tiered review, including: excessive rigidity, uneven
application, and difficulty in determining whether a class is suspect); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks
in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 172–77
(1984) (sharply criticizing the multi-tiered system of review as too rigid, inhibitive of actual
analysis, and subject to inconsistent internal application).
159. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (determining whether a group is a
“suspect” class by inquiring whether that group’s members have been subjected to
discrimination, exhibit obvious or immutable characteristics, and are a minority or politically
powerless).
160. In some cases, the Court might soften strict scrutiny due to institutional factors, thus
silently bundling an amorphous institutional analysis into the application of the relevant tier of
scrutiny. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216–17 (1944) (deferring to the
political branches in times of war despite ostensible application of the “most rigid scrutiny”);
NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
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Grutter v. Bollinger provides a helpful example.161 The Court in Grutter
applied strict scrutiny to the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative
action policy on the basis that it amounted to racial discrimination.162
Notwithstanding the ostensibly high level of scrutiny, the Court, recognizing
the Law School’s superior institutional authority, deferred to the Law
School’s academic judgment and upheld the policy, declaring that diversity
was a compelling government interest and that the challenged affirmative
action program was an acceptable way to achieve that interest.163 In other
words, the Court’s doctrinal analysis provided by the applicable tier of
scrutiny militated for rigorous review, but its institutional analysis, based
primarily on the epistemic authority of the Law School, militated for much
more deferential review. In Grutter, the institutional analysis seemed to win
out, as the Court deferred to the Law School and upheld the challenged
admissions policy. Of course, other factors, such as the individualized nature
of the admissions policy,164 played a big role in the outcome of the case, so
institutional deference was likely not the determinative factor. Nevertheless,
the Law School’s special institutional characteristics did seem to help soften
the strict scrutiny that otherwise applied.165
The Court’s approach in Grutter implies that institutional concerns can
shape the appropriate level of deference afforded in practice, regardless of
which tier of scrutiny applies. But Grutter did not explicitly embrace this
conclusion, and the Court’s approach in similar cases complicates the
picture. For instance, in Grutter’s companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, the
Court rejected the affirmative action program of the University of Michigan
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts.166 Whereas the Court found
that the law school’s admissions program considered applicants as
individuals, the college in Gratz utilized a more mechanical, impersonal
point system, 167 upon which the Court frowned.
The particulars of the admissions plans at issue in Grutter and Gratz
obviously differed, and largely explain the two cases’ disparate outcomes.
That being said, the Court did not explain why the strict scrutiny triggered
by the substantive, doctrinal issue (race discrimination) should figure more
PUBLIC POLICY 254 (1994) (discussing Korematsu and the Pentagon Papers case as examples of
cases in which institutional issues created a “variation” in the application of the otherwise
applicable level of scrutiny); Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2042–45, 2087–
91 (discussing the Korematsu Court’s failure to consider administrative factors).
161. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
162. Id. at 326–28 (applying strict scrutiny to all racial classifications, including affirmative
action).
163. See id. at 328–33.
164. See id. at 334.
165. See id. at 328.
166. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251, 275–76 (2003).
167. See id. at 255.
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prominently in Gratz than in Grutter, where institution-based deference
seemed to soften the rigors of that scrutiny. While much more could be said
about these decisions, the primary point here is that the Court has failed to
adopt a consistent and explicit approach for reconciling its doctrinal
deference determinations (guided by the tiers of scrutiny) with its more ad
hoc institution-based deference determinations.168 The Court clearly is
considering institutional factors in some way, but it is not explaining how
those factors affect the rest of the constitutional inquiry.
C. DEFERENCE DETERMINATIONS, STEALTH CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING,
AND THE STATUS OF LAW
Though these examples of deference determinations differ in
significant ways, they all require the Court to ask whether it should respect
the judgment of a political branch on the basis of that branch’s institutional
characteristics. Given that constitutional law at its essence asks courts to
determine “who decides,” it is noteworthy that the Court’s consideration of
the institutional capabilities of the potential “deciders” is so haphazard.
Due to the Court’s sparse rationales and contradictory approaches to
deference determinations, it is unclear to what extent these determinations
enjoy the status of law.169 Deference determinations pretend to be law-like
but in important ways lack the predictability, transparency, and rigor
generally associated with law.170 They therefore usually do not operate with
the full force of precedent. Constitutional doctrine more generally may also
be more lacking in this regard than other areas of law. Constitutional
precedent, for instance, generally enjoys less respect than precedent-

168. See also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509–10 (2005) (refusing to apply
otherwise applicable institution-based deference analysis because race discrimination triggers
strict scrutiny); supra notes 122–29 and accompanying text.
169. Cf. Gluck, supra note 19, at 1908 (arguing that “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court generally
does not treat its [statutory interpretive] methodological statements as ‘law’”); supra note 19
and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 19, at 63–65 (discussing clarity and the rule of law); RAZ,
supra note 19, at 212–19 (describing features of the rule of law, including openness and
stability); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 671, 678 (1999) (“The rule of law requires that statutes . . . be applied in an
objective, consistent, and transparent way to citizens and others subject to the state’s
authority.”); Richard K. Greenstein, Why the Rule of Law?, 66 LA. L. REV. 63, 69 (2005) (“[T]he
rule of law seems to require that law be knowable, i.e., that law’s meaning be more or less
transparent and its applications more or less predictable, so that anyone can consult the law
both to determine what the law permits, prohibits, or requires, and to identify the limits, such
as constitutional limits, on the coercive use of law.”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (“Even in simpler times uncertainty has been
regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law.”).
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interpreting statutes.171 Nevertheless, we generally have a good sense of the
key inquiries and tests that apply under many constitutional doctrines. The
tiers of scrutiny in equal-protection cases, for example, may be applied
inconsistently and, properly understood, really exist on a spectrum rather
than in three discrete levels.172 But litigants are at least familiar with these
basic tiers, and the Court itself usually purports to follow them.173 Indeed,
treatises and hornbooks sketch out the contours of constitutional doctrine,
even if that doctrine is imprecise.174 No such treatises do or could explicate
the law of deference, or of any other stealth determination for that matter.
This is not to argue that deference determinations completely lack legal
status. They seem to carry some precedential force. The Court, for instance,
often repeats that it reviews Congress’s factual findings deferentially,175
suggesting that this “rule” is a precedent of sorts. But these recitations are
sometimes ignored altogether.176 Indeed, unlike black-letter constitutional
doctrine or deference formulas in administrative law cases,177 deference
determinations in constitutional cases often share no common test bringing
some semblance of order to the inquiry.178 Even when the Court seems to be
asking similar questions across cases, as in Garrett and Hibbs, its willingness to
accept Congress’s facts is strikingly irregular.179 Deference determinations
and other stealth determinations, then, seem to enjoy even less precedential
respect than constitutional doctrine. In this regard, these stealth

171.

E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 631–32 (4th ed. 2007); Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro
Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 217, 235–36 (2007).
172. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]his Court . . . has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 689 (4th ed. 2011) (summarizing critics contending that
“although the Court speaks in terms of three tiers of review, in reality there is a spectrum of
standards of review”); Sunstein, supra note 112, at 77 (“The hard edges [of tiered review have]
softened, and there has been at least a modest convergence away from tiers and toward general
balancing of relevant interests.”).
173. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 172, at 686 (explaining that “all equal protection
issues” boil down to three questions: “What is the classification? What level of scrutiny should be
applied? Does the particular government action meet the level of scrutiny?”).
174. See generally id.
175. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC (Turner Broad. II ), 520 U.S. 180, 199 (1997); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
176. See supra Part I.A.1.
177. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45
(1984) (providing for deference to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguities within
the statutes they administer).
178. See supra Part I.A.
179. See supra notes 1–7, 42–65 and accompanying text.
AND THE
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determinations are perhaps more akin to canons of statutory interpretation,
which also are commonly invoked but often ignored.180
The legal uncertainty resulting from the Court’s haphazard and
incomplete approach is especially problematic for lower courts, which
struggle to faithfully follow the Supreme Court’s directives.181 Consequently,
lower courts’ deference case law is similarly inconsistent.182 Given that the
bulk of judicial decisions construing the U.S. Constitution are rendered not
by the Supreme Court but state courts and lower federal courts,183 these
inconsistencies infect constitutional adjudication at all levels. The end result
is a muddled constitutional law, which increases the public’s distrust of the
judiciary, especially in constitutional cases.184
This phenomenon of incomplete, under-theorized determinations that
fall outside or at the margins of the black-letter doctrine but nonetheless
frequently recur in constitutional decisions is hardly limited to deference
determinations. Indeed, the Court makes a variety of such haphazard,
stealth determinations. Very little constrains the Court when it decides, inter
alia, whether and how to count state practices,185 construe a question at a
180. See Gluck, supra note 19, at 1902 (“The U.S. Supreme Court generally does not treat
its statements about statutory interpretation methodology as law.”).
181. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77–78 (1994) (“[L]ower court judges dislike being
reversed on appeal.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior,
and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 370 (1980) (noting that reversal “reduces the
nonpecuniary income of [an inferior court judge’s] job by destroying the precedential value of
his decision”); Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 111 (1989) (“[R]eversals by higher courts are embarrassing . . . .”). But see
Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 405 (2005)
(concluding that “it appears unlikely that the risk of reversal plays a prominent role in circuit
court decision making”).
182. See, e.g., Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to defer to
congressional fact-finding because of a “lack of consensus . . . in the medical community”),
rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 644–45 (8th Cir. 1995) (declining to
apply a Turner Broadcasting I level of deference to a state voter initiative); United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 582–83 (3rd Cir. 1995) (deferring to congressional findings in a case
challenging the constitutionality of federal carjacking law); Independence Inst. v. Buescher,
718 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1275–76 (D. Colo. 2010) (finding that “the Court is not required to pay
deference to the legislative findings” despite a general presumption of deference to such
findings); Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1226 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (“[F]ederal courts must
be careful to not unnecessarily declare state laws invalid, whether enacted by legislature or by
the voters themselves.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998).
183. See Frederick Schauer, Justice Stevens and the Size of Constitutional Decisions, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 543, 559 (1996) (“The overwhelming majority of important constitutional decisions are
made by state courts, lower federal courts, and federal, state, and local officials . . . .”).
184. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 817, 853–54 (1994) (noting that perceived legitimacy stems partially from consistency).
185. Compare Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2015 (2010) (finding unconstitutional
the imposition of life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders guilty of a nonhomicide
crime even though “[t]hirty-seven States, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government
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broad or narrow level of generality,186 borrow from another area of
constitutional reasoning,187 construe a challenge as facial or as-applied,188 or
even select a constitutional methodology.189 To the extent the Court fails to
articulate a consistent, reasoned approach to these determinations, much of
its constitutional decision making is guided by factors outside the stated
doctrine. Significantly, these various stealth determinations are more
integral to constitutional meaning than judicial opinions would suggest. The
project of teasing constitutional doctrine out of the document’s text is not
easy. But while familiar doctrinal tests reflecting the Court’s efforts to do so
are very significant,190 most judges and many scholars have focused on them
to the exclusion of other judicial determinations that fall outside black-letter
doctrine but nonetheless contribute to the project of expounding the
Constitution. Deference determinations, for example, are very much a part
of the Constitution’s meaning, getting to the heart of which governmental
institutions enjoy the prerogative of deciding particular issues. Courts
nonetheless have failed to systematically conceptualize how they work and
how they interact with doctrinal tests.
In short, deference determinations and other stealth determinations
ought to be treated more like other constitutional doctrine, however flawed
it may be. The Court should explicate these determinations more carefully,
render them more consistently, and articulate more precisely how they affect
doctrinal inquiries. The Court, one senses, is not wholly unaware of these
concerns, sometimes seeming to articulate an approach to deference
determinations,191 as though it too desires greater predictability. Courts
should follow this instinct and try to confer greater legal status upon their

permit sentences of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide offender”), with Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 423 (2008) (striking down capital punishment for child rape in part
because forty-four states have not made child rape a capital offense).
186. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (concluding that Bowers framed
the question at too narrow a level of generality and failed “to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake”), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (framing the issue as a
right to engage in homosexual sodomy). See generally Eric Berger, Lawrence at Ten: Same-Sex
Marriage and Stealth Constitutional Determinations, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming
2013).
187. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–75 (invoking equal-protection norms in substantive due
process cases); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (identifying precedent as
“hybrid” cases involving free exercise and another fundamental right).
188. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2000) (arguing that the success of facial challenges is not “governed
by any general formula defining the conditions for successful facial challenges” but rather turns
on the underlying substantive claim).
189. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1991)
(discussing different modalities of constitutional interpretation).
190. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

A1_BERGER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

498

12/19/2012 11:05 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:465

determinations by addressing the institutional factors the inquiry purports to
value in the first place.
II. DEFERENCE DETERMINATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES
A. THE INSTITUTIONAL-ANALYSIS APPROACH
While substantive factors often play an important role in determining
“who decides,” they should not be the only factors courts consult in making
this decision.192 Various considerations, including the political branches’
expertise, political authority, and diligence in performing their duties,
should also play a role. The Court could improve the consistency and
theoretical rigor of its deference determinations through an institutionalanalysis approach that actually examines the institutional characteristics it
purports to value. Given that the Supreme Court sometimes justifies
deference on account of the special institutional characteristics of the
political branches,193 it is odd that the Court does not pay greater attention
to the actual characteristics of those institutions.194 To deal with this issue,
courts should examine how the relevant political institution has behaved in
a given case before deciding to defer. This institutional-analysis approach
would encourage courts to do their due diligence when making deference
determinations, drawing on the epistemic and democratic concerns that
often fuel deference in the first place.
Much scholarly literature focuses on institutional choice more
generally, often emphasizing courts’ inherent democratic and epistemic
weaknesses in comparison to the political branches.195 Instead of proposing

192. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 727
(2008) (arguing that constitutional law scholarship is beginning to address “which institution
should determine the content of the law—that is, [beginning] to ‘decid[e] who decides’”
(quoting KOMESAR, supra note 160, at 3)).
193. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner Broad. II ), 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)
(“We owe Congress’ findings deference in part because the institution ‘is far better equipped
than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon’ legislative
questions.” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner Broad. I ), 512 U.S. 622, 665–66
(1994) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Comm’r v. Engle, 464 U.S.
206, 230 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“One reason for that deference is that the
Commissioner is better able than any court, including this one, to assess the practical
consequences of particular interpretations and to resolve statutory ambiguities in ways that
minimize administrative difficulties.”); Horwitz, supra note 12, at 1074–75.
194. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 160, at 196 (arguing that constitutional law is “about
institutional choice”); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 1 (2006) (“What decision-procedures should particular
institutions, with their particular capacities, use to interpret this text?” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
195. See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 194, at 158 (discussing judges’ need to make
“interpretive choices in the face of impoverished information” with “only limited capacity to
generate the needed information”); Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the
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a grand theory of institutional choice, the institutional-analysis approach
proposed here cautions that the political branches’ relative democratic and
epistemic superiority will likely vary from case to case, depending on who
within the government is acting and how they are doing their job. Similarly,
courts’ own capacity to competently review the decisions of the other
branches also varies across cases. Accordingly, courts deciding whether to
defer should assess the political branches’ actual job performance in the
case at hand, as opposed to relying on stereotypes about each branch’s
strengths and weaknesses.196 Courts likewise must consider in context their
own strengths and weaknesses relative to the institutions they review.197
Increased judicial attention to how political institutions function in
practice will require greater attention at trial to the political branches’ job
performance.198 Trial lawyers will need to review public documents and
sometimes depose or examine witnesses to develop a record of government
behavior. Where legislative action is at issue, this attention might require
careful consideration of the Congressional Record, committee reports, and
other indicators of fact-finding.199 Similar judicial examination of the
administrative record should also be possible in cases involving agencies.200
Unlike administrative law cases, in which these questions take center stage,
courts only sometimes examine these procedural factors in constitutional
cases.
This inconsistency is regrettable. Though courts often focus their
constitutional review on substantive issues, there are good reasons to think
that questions of institutional procedure and behavior are also worthy of
judicial scrutiny—perhaps even more so.201 For one, substantive issues tend
to yield profound disagreement, both among judges and between the
different branches of government. Indeed, judges often disagree on which
Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 661–63 (1988) (discussing
courts’ lack of democratic legitimacy and the physical impossibility of courts examining an
increasingly complex government); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,
115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1353 (2006) (arguing that one of the two major weaknesses of judicial
review is its democratic illegitimacy).
196. Cf. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process,
91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1974 (2011); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV.
197, 255 (1976).
197. See KOMESAR, supra note 160, at 197 (deriding institutional analysis that fails to
compare the political branches with the judiciary itself); Neil K. Komesar, The Perils of Pandora:
Further Reflections on Institutional Choice, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 999 (1997)
(“[I]nstitutional choice can be effectively approached only by employing comparative
institutional analysis.”).
198. See infra Part II.B–C.
199. See infra Part II.B.1.
200. See infra Part II.B.2.
201. See generally Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 196, at 1970–74 (arguing for judicial review of
the legislative process).
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normative substantive standards courts should use to announce what the law
is.202 Hence, judicial pronouncements on substantive matters of
constitutional law are more likely to be highly controversial, potentially
undermining the institutional legitimacy of the court.203 By contrast, judges
are somewhat more likely to agree on procedural and institutional issues,
particularly where administrative agency action is at issue and administrative
law can serve as a guide.204 And while there is great disagreement over
whether judicial review of Congress’s internal procedures is appropriate, or
even constitutional,205 calling for courts to link deference to congressional factfinding procedures should be less contentious, given that deference itself
should hinge on institutional questions. Courts, then, would not be
reviewing the propriety of congressional procedures themselves, but rather
investigating the care and rigor of those procedures to determine whether
the resulting fact-findings merit presumptive respect. In this regard, the
institutional-analysis approach is substantially more modest than dueprocess-of-lawmaking calls for invalidating legislation enacted through
inadequate procedures.206
In short, deference determinations should be more closely tied to the
political branches’ actual behavior. Importantly, such an institution-based
deference determination should only be one step of the constitutional
analysis. After deciding whether to defer, courts should (and typically do)
proceed to analyze the substantive constitutional right at issue. Deference
determinations, in other words, should not be the sum of the judicial
inquiry but rather a lens through which courts should conduct the
substantive constitutional analysis.207

202. See id. at 1930; David Estlund, Introduction to DEMOCRACY 1, 6–7 (David Estlund ed.,
2002).
203. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 944–45 (1973) (suggesting that disagreement is an inevitable result of substantive
constitutional decisions, and that such disagreement leads many to simply dismiss the Court’s
disfavored decisions as “Lochnering”).
204. See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2054–58.
205. Compare Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 196, at 1974 (arguing that judicial review of
legislative procedure “is no less important and, in fact, is more justifiable than substantive
judicial review”), and Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181,
228–29 (1997) (arguing that the judiciary does and should review the constitutionality of
Congress’s law-making procedures), with Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine:
Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1505–07 (2005) (arguing that “there is no justification for
judicial review” of Congress’s internal procedures), and Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation
and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1530–39 (2008) (arguing that judicial
involvement in Congress’s internal procedures, if constitutional, would be “fraught with
difficulty”).
206. See generally Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 196; Linde, supra note 196.
207. E.g., Berger, Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 75; Berger, Administrative Law Norms,
supra note 12, at 2037, 2075.
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B. INSTITUTIONALLY BASED DEFERENCE DETERMINATIONS
Part I discussed three institutional contexts in constitutional cases in
which the Court is faced with the question of whether to defer to the
political branches. This Subpart examines the institutional-analysis approach
with respect to deference determinations in each of these situations. The
inquiries proposed here would not only tether deference determinations
more closely to the institutional questions underlying such determinations
but also help bring greater consistency to courts’ stealth constitutional
decision making.208
1. Institutional Analysis of Congressional Fact-Finding
Congress may “have substantial staff, funds, time and procedures to
devote to effective information gathering and sorting,”209 but that does not
mean it always makes use of these institutional strengths. The Court lacks
any consistent approach for assessing whether Congress has made use of
such capabilities. To improve the rigor of its deference determinations, the
Court should consider more consistently whether Congress has taken
advantage of its institutional strengths. More precisely, the Court should ask
whether Congress’s fact-findings were based on careful analysis and
empirical study of relevant facts, or bald, self-serving assertions, or
something in between.210 This analysis would not only help reward Congress
for diligence but would also help the Court more cleanly separate its
deference determinations from its analysis of the substantive merits.211
It may well be true that Congress in theory is better equipped than
courts to amass facts, but that does not mean that Congress always utilizes its
institutional advantages when doing so. As scholars have noted, Congress
often lacks strong incentives to use those resources to make a good-faith
factual inquiry, choosing instead to use its fact-gathering procedures for

208. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 25
(1979) (“If [judges’] justifications cannot be stated in the opinion, they should not be relied
upon in entering the judgment.”); Sunstein, supra note 112, at 22 (arguing that a judicial
opinion “is supposed to explain the outcome of the case”).
209. Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 527, 578 (1994); see also F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of
Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1473 (2010) (noting that Congress has access to
institutions like the Congressional Research Service to facilitate fact-finding).
210. See supra Part I.A.1. Though the principles suggested here may also be relevant to
judicial review of state legislative fact-findings, this Article’s focus is on deference to
congressional fact-finding.
211. See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary
Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1170–71 (2001).
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political ends,212 undermining the reliability of its “factual” findings.
Motivated primarily by reelection, many members of Congress may be more
invested in finding facts to support legislation desirable to their constituents
and financial supporters rather than undertaking a good-faith exploration of
the relevant policy area.213 Members of Congress can, in fact, harm the
veracity of a factual record by packing committees, choosing biased
witnesses, and selectively presenting only a limited portion of findings to the
whole Congress.214 One should thus not assume that the congressional
record is necessarily more trustworthy than judicially determined facts.215
Courts, therefore, should examine Congress’s fact-finding procedures
for rigor and good faith. When Congress merely asserts “facts” it wishes to be
true to support its legislative agenda, its fact-findings deserve less
deference.216 By contrast, when Congress carefully investigates an issue,
compiles copious amounts of data,217 and appears to be genuinely
considering an issue from multiple perspectives, its factual record deserves

212. See Araiza, supra note 21, at 6; Devins, supra note 211, at 1194–99 (discussing both
Congress’s fact-finding capacities and the lack of incentives to use those capacities diligently in
some situations).
213. E.g., Devins, supra note 211, at 1182; John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging
Facts like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 91–92 (2008); Kate T. Spelman, Revising Judicial Review
of Legislative Findings of Scientific and Medical “Fact”: A Modified Due Process Approach, 64 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837, 865 (2009). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW
MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 89–248 (2011) (arguing that financial
campaign contributions distort Congress’s policy and distract legislators from addressing the
public good).
214. E.g., Pilchen, supra note 25, at 367–68.
215. Professor Araiza contends that we should also be suspicious of congressional “facts”
that conveniently fit existing constitutional tests, because they “raise[] . . . suspicion that
Congress is attempting to wrest interpretive power away from the courts.” See Araiza, supra note
21, at 28–29.
216. See Elizabeth DeCoux, Does Congress Find Facts or Construct Them? The Ascendance of
Politics over Reliability, Perfected in Gonzales v. Carhart, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319, 326 (2008)
(“[P]olitical considerations have infected fact-finding to an increasing extent, to the point that
almost all fact-finding in modern hearings is deliberately shaped so as to accomplish a political
goal.”); Devins, supra note 211, at 1182 (“[I]t is certainly true that lawmakers are partisans and
that congressional decision-making, including factfinding, is often about the pursuit of desired
outcomes.”); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1175 (2007)
(“[O]ften [Congress members] are locked into positions by ideology or political pressure
before the hearing ever begins. Then the hearing is a charade.”); McGinnis & Mulaney, supra
note 213, at 96 (“[Congress members] will be focused on creating a legislative record that will
put the legislation in the most favorable light.”).
217. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 940 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that Congress spent years
developing a record of 100,000 pages); Lisa Barré-Quick & Shannon Matthew Kasley, The Road
Less Traveled: Obstacles in the Path of the Effective Use of the Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against
Women Act in the Employment Context, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 415, 437–38 (1998) (describing
the impressive detail and extent of the congressional record for the Violence Against Women
Act).
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more respect.218 The spectrum of congressional care is obviously broad, and
judges should accord greatest deference to the resulting fact-findings when
Congress’s methods are most rigorous.
It is, of course, not always easy for courts to discern congressional rigor
and good faith, but it is possible, especially when Congress conducts sham
proceedings to justify a pre-ordained outcome. For example, in Planned
Parenthood Federation of America v. Ashcroft, a case challenging the
constitutionality of Congress’s Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, the trial court
closely examined Congress’s fact-finding procedures and carefully compared
those findings with trial-court testimony.219 The court’s meticulous
examination of the evidence Congress considered220 led it to conclude that
much of Congress’s hearings had focused on “policy-based” rather than
medical and scientific evidence.221 As the court pointed out, the evidence
Congress gathered contradicted its ultimate factual conclusion that there
was medical consensus that “partial-birth” abortion procedures were “never
medically necessary.”222 The court thus refused to defer, noting that “[i]f a
legislature could make a statute constitutional simply by ‘finding’ that black
is white or freedom, slavery, judicial review would be an elaborate farce.”223
Despite the Supreme Court’s subsequent reversal,224 the trial court’s
approach, from a methodological standpoint, is praiseworthy.225 In effect,
the court was distinguishing between Congress’s genuine effort to craft
policy based on a careful examination of complicated facts and more cynical
factual manipulation designed to support legislation pleasing powerful

218. See Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act: How
Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 396 (2008)
(“The [South Carolina v.] Katzenbach Court deferred to congressional judgment, in part, because
the congressional record and deliberative process preceding the Act indicated that Congress
carefully studied the need for the [Voting Rights Act].”).
219. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1013–32 (N.D.
Cal. 2004), aff’d, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124 (2007).
220. Id. at 1014.
221. Id. at 1017.
222. Id. at 1024; see also id. at 1025 (“Congress’ very findings contradict its assertion that
there is a consensus.”).
223. Id. at 1032 (quoting Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 392 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
224. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1706 (2008) (“The
Carhart decision emerged from the efforts of an antiabortion movement frustrated by its
inability to overturn Roe.”).
225. Of course, it may be difficult for those on either side of the abortion debate to
separate the contentious constitutional issue from the institutional deference determination
here, but my attention is solely to the issue of deference.
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interest groups.226 Through its scrupulous inspection of the legislative
record, the trial court properly called into serious question the validity of
Congress’s “factual” findings, concluding “that Congress has not drawn
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence, and its findings are
therefore not entitled to substantial deference.”227
Some critics may pose separation-of-powers and political-authority
objections to this kind of review and contend that courts’ lack of democratic
legitimacy and political accountability alone is reason enough to defer to
Congress.228 Such an approach implicitly contends that genuine expertise
does not matter; instead, democratic legitimacy should trump other
considerations, and elected legislators are far more politically accountable
than unelected judges.229 This separation-of-powers argument, while
important, is overstated. If courts automatically deferred to legislative facts
because legislators are elected, legislatures could exempt themselves from
judicial review simply by finding convenient constitutional facts, thereby
insulating its legislation from meaningful judicial inquiry. Such an outcome
would sharply limit judicial review’s important role in our system of
separation of powers.230 Thus, even if we accept that courts should generally
give the elected branches’ policy judgments the benefit of the doubt, this
benefit should not necessarily require accepting even the most dubious of
the political branches’ findings.
Of course, while it is sometimes obvious that Congress has or has not
gathered evidence carefully, the legislative record can be unclear. Planned
Parenthood Federation is an extreme example, given the obvious disconnect
between Congress’s findings and the available medical evidence.231
226. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 171, at 47–81 (summarizing different theories
of legislation).
227. Planned Parenthood Fed’n, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1013–14.
228. See Note, Judicial Review of Congressional Factfinding, 122 HARV. L. REV. 767, 768 (2008)
(objecting to judicial review of congressional fact-finding on separation-of-powers grounds).
229. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory
Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 371 (2005) (“The Constitution gives the legislative power to
the politically accountable Congress; politically unaccountable judges have no business making
policy choices of the kind that our Constitution entrusts to the political branches.”); Emerson
H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
215, 215 (1999) (reasoning that the life tenure of federal judges makes them politically
unaccountable).
230. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000) (“If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their
own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other
departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption . . . . It is far
more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between
the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits
assigned to their authority.”).
231. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. Even the Supreme Court, in reversing
the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of Planned Parenthood Federation, recognized the weakness of
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Appellate courts, therefore, should also assess how much they trust both
their own and lower courts’ assessment of Congress’s findings—that is,
whether the judiciary’s institutional analysis is likely to be correct, given its
own institutional limitations and its competence to comprehend the sources
it has reviewed.232
Significantly, substandard fact-finding would not render a statute
automatically unconstitutional. Even when the Court concludes that
Congress’s facts are incorrect or have been gathered sloppily, it should still
uphold legislation that is properly within Congress’s powers and not
otherwise unconstitutional. A judicial determination that Congress used
flawed fact-finding processes would simply militate against deference,
because facts found by a self-serving legislature are probably less trustworthy
than those found by less partial trial courts.233
Far from constituting judicial overreaching, such deference
determinations are inevitable in constitutional litigation. Our judicial system
requires that legal questions be resolved in factual contexts,234 and courts
necessarily must decide which factual view of the world they accept.
Consequently, where Congress has announced its view of the factual state of
the world, courts necessarily must decide whether they should accept that
view. To refuse deference to bogus congressional findings is not to insist on
certain legislative procedures, but rather to recognize that deference to the
legislature’s epistemic authority makes no sense if the legislature does not
have or use the expertise it is presumed to enjoy.
2. Institutional Analysis of Administrative Action
a.

Institutional Analysis of Agency Epistemic Authority

Just as courts should scrutinize the processes underlying congressional
fact-finding before deferring to Congress’s facts, so too should courts
examine agency processes before deferring to administrative agencies on
account of their epistemic authority. Often, an administrative agency will
have expertise and make good use of it, in which case judicial deference on

Congress’s factual findings. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166 (2007) (“Uncritical
deference to Congress’ factual findings in these cases is inappropriate.”).
232. One danger with this approach is that Congress sometimes relies on sources that do
not appear in the record. A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy K. Simeone, Remanding to Congress:
The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 328, 383 (2001). To this extent, courts should recognize that they may not always have a
full picture of congressional processes.
233. See McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 213, at 92–94 (explaining that, from the publicchoice perspective on congressional fact-finding, legislators’ predominant interest is getting reelected, thus creating a strong incentive to find facts that will help them remain in office).
234. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (stipulating that the judicial power of the United States
extends to “Cases” and “Controversies”).
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epistemic grounds is perfectly appropriate. However, as discussed above,
sometimes the Court defers in constitutional cases on account of expertise
where closer examination would have indicated that such expertise was in
fact lacking.235
More rigorous judicial analysis of agency procedures is especially
important where agency action might otherwise escape meaningful
administrative review, as is the case with some state and federal
administrative agencies that are explicitly or functionally exempted from
administrative law procedures.236 Many high-profile constitutional cases, in
fact, involve administrative action escaping ordinary administrative review.237
Agencies who know their actions are unlikely to be subjected to typical
arbitrary-and-capricious review may be less inclined to adhere to standard
administrative procedures, including requirements that they utilize their
expertise.238 Closer attention to agency competence, then, would help the
Court avoid granting unwarranted deference based on ostensible epistemic
authority.
Of course, agencies often do possess expertise worthy of deference.
Administrative agencies exist, in large part, to address complicated problems
with an attention to detail and a specialized expertise that the legislature
usually cannot offer.239 Whereas legislatures must deal with a diverse array of
subjects, most agencies operate within a narrower sphere of competence. As
a result, agencies often possess a technocratic, professional expert staff that
legislatures typically lack.240 Because they have fewer issues on their plate
than Congress, agencies also can focus on their tasks with greater attention
than can Congress, which must confront numerous problems
simultaneously. Expertise, then, is central to agencies’ identity and raison
d’être.241

235. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
236. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096
(2009) (arguing that administrative law contains a series of “black holes” explicitly exempting
agencies from administrative law and “grey holes” which provide “constraints . . . so
insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases”); infra notes 307, 349
and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (plurality opinion); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 327–29 (2003); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1944); Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2038–
47.
238. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
239. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 79, at 19 (“[M]uch of the impetus for the creation of
many prominent administrative agencies can be traced to a desire for the exercise of an expert
rather than a lay or political judgment.”).
240. See STRAUSS, supra note 78, at 135 (describing agency staffs as “professional rather than
political in character”).
241. E.g., Saul Zipkin, Administering Election Law, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 641, 679–80 (2012).
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Nevertheless, agencies do not always act with the expertise they are
supposed to enjoy, and when they do not, deference is less deserved.242
Courts can determine the extent of agency expertise in constitutional cases
by considering the same factors they examine when reviewing agency action
in administrative law cases.243 First, courts should consider whether the
agency enjoys genuine epistemic authority over the relevant subject matter,
and, second, whether it exercises that expertise with some degree of care
and thoroughness.244 While these factors should not themselves solely
determine the outcome of cases, they should help shape deference. As the
Supreme Court itself has said, an administrative agency has “an obligation to
perform its responsibilities with some degree of expertise.”245
Courts do not always verify epistemic authority, but their general focus
on technocratic competence in administrative law cases demonstrates a
commitment to expert-based, agency decision making.246 When agencies
have no more facility with the facts than courts, there is no reason for courts
to defer on epistemic grounds. To the contrary, given that courts frequently
deal with facts outside their area of expertise, they may be better than
agencies at understanding complicated areas to which they previously have
been unexposed.247 Relatedly, epistemic authority has little value if agencies
do not make use of it.248 Administrative law, therefore, generally requires
that agencies not only understand the relevant topic but also that they
consider all relevant evidence from a variety of angles.249 As the Court has
explained in the administrative law context, an agency acts arbitrarily and
capriciously if it has:

242. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2354 (2001)
(“[N]ot all agency action entails the application of expertise, even when the action properly
should do so.”).
243. See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2058–74.
244. Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (calibrating deference based on
“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade”).
245. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 115 (1976).
246. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119
YALE L.J. 2, 1529 (2009) (discussing the judiciary’s search for agencies’ technocratic
expertise).
247. Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that the
trial judge’s role as a “gatekeep[er]” of expert testimony is to ensure that the claimed basis for
scientific testimony is valid).
248. See RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE LEGAL ARGUMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 217 (1998) (arguing that decision makers deserve less
deference when they do “not actually investigate despite their capacity to do so”).
249. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (requiring that
the court determine whether an agency made a decision “based on a consideration of the
relevant factors”).
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entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.250
These kinds of inquiries require examining the administrative record
and other indicators of agency decision making. While litigation does not
always uncover all important information, it certainly can substantially
narrow or even eliminate the epistemic gap between courts and other
governmental institutions.251 Nevertheless, though careful review of the
administrative record is prominent in administrative law cases, courts and
litigants do not always consider these issues in constitutional cases.252 Under
the institutional-analysis approach, they would start doing so. Moreover,
where the administrative record is incomplete, litigants should use the
Freedom of Information Act, state equivalents, and ordinary discovery rules
to ascertain the agencies’ underlying procedures.253 After all, whereas
litigants in administrative law cases are limited to the administrative law
record, general civil litigants, including in constitutional cases, may pursue
broader discovery.254 To this extent, parties accessing this information
usually need not employ litigation techniques different from what they
already use.255
The fruits of this discovery can be crucial to the question of deference.
To give just one example, in a case challenging the constitutionality of
Missouri’s lethal injection procedure, a deposition revealed that the State
had delegated complete authority over the procedure to someone with no
understanding of the relevant drugs and their potential to cause

250. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
251. See Chesney, supra note 130, at 1407 (“Even if we assume that the executive branch as
an initial matter has an informational advantage due to restraints on its ability to pass
information through to the judge, this advantage could be offset thanks to information
gathering advantages of the adversarial process.”).
252. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
253. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (providing for agencies to make information public subject
to exceptions); FED. R. CIV. P. 2637 (providing for disclosure and discovery rules in civil
litigation); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 2(a)(3)(4) (1961) (requiring state
agencies to “make available for public inspection all rules and all other written statements of
policy,” as well as “all final orders, decisions, and opinions”).
254. See infra notes 347–50 and accompanying text.
255. To the extent sensitive material sometimes may arise, the government could seek to
protect that information through in camera hearings or other protective measures. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(c) (stating that courts may issue protective orders); cf. Chesney, supra note 130, at
1426–28 (suggesting that deference is not the best way of addressing secrecy concerns in
national-security contexts).
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excruciating pain.256 Such evidence speaks directly to the State’s epistemic
incompetence and should militate strongly against deference. Nevertheless,
these considerations are often shortchanged in lethal injection litigation.257
Indeed, as discussed above, Baze assumed, without much inquiry, that
Kentucky possessed epistemic authority worthy of deference, even though
the experience in Missouri and other states demonstrated that state
expertise should not be taken for granted.258
Given agencies’ peculiar constitutional status, these kinds of inquiries
are especially appropriate for judicial review of agency action.259 Whereas
some critics may posit that courts should never interfere with internal
congressional procedures, courts already do closely monitor internal agency
procedures in administrative law proceedings. Moreover, administrative law
requirements that agency policies not be arbitrary and capricious stem, at
least partially, “from the administrative agency’s unique constitutional
position.”260 Precisely because agencies cannot be “permitted unbridled
discretion [lest] their actions . . . violate important constitutional principles
of separation of powers and checks and balances,”261 it makes sense for
courts to scrutinize their expertise before affording deference on that
ground.
It should be emphasized that expertise is necessarily relative, and courts
must weigh the political actor’s expertise against their own.262 When an
appellate court is particularly poorly suited to make factual findings on a
given matter—perhaps because the trial record is sparse or because the
subject matter is highly technical—it should be more inclined to defer to the
agency’s expertise, subject, of course, to that branch’s own limitations. By
contrast, if there is a developed trial record and good reason to think that
courts would be competent at finding the kinds of facts at issue, less
presumptive deference to the agency is appropriate in constitutional cases.
Of course, the primary attention should be to the agency, and if there is
good reason also to trust its findings, then some deference will often be

256. See Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (W.D. Mo.
June 26, 2006) (discussing doctor’s deposition), rev’d, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007); Berger,
Lethal Injection, supra note 87, at 268–70 (discussing information yielded from deposition).
257. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1082–85 (8th Cir. 2007) (failing to take full
account of the DOC’s epistemic incompetence and reversing the district court’s holding that
Missouri’s lethal injection procedure violated the Eighth Amendment); Berger, Lethal Injection,
supra note 87, at 301–14.
258. Berger, Lethal Injection, supra note 87, at 265–72 (discussing several states’ lack of
expertise with lethal injection procedures).
259. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
260. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 536 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
261. Id.
262. See KOMESAR, supra note 160, at 6–7 (arguing for comparative institutional analysis).
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warranted, even if courts have reason to trust their own fact-findings.
However, given that courts are implicitly deciding whether judges or other
actors have superior expertise, they should not lose sight of the fact that
their own epistemic competence will vary from case-to-case. Similarly, they
should consider their own tendency to underestimate or (perhaps more
likely) overestimate their own ability to weigh their institutional competence
against the political branches.263 While some judges may be better than
others at this self-reflection, mere awareness of the matter should help some
courts recognize that they are not necessarily the best arbiter of their own
shortcomings.
b.

Institutional Analysis of Agency Political Authority

Courts should also consider the actual political authority of government
institutions before predicating deference on democratic legitimacy.
Alexander Bickel famously argued that judicial review is problematic
because it allows unelected judges to overturn the policies of elected,
politically accountable legislatures or chief executives.264 One might
accordingly assume that judicial review would be less problematic when
unelected, less accountable officials designed the challenged policies. While
factors, such as separation of powers and federalism, may militate for
deference in certain circumstances, courts ought not assume that unelected
administrative officials enjoy democratic legitimacy equivalent to that of
elected legislatures and chief executives.265 Nevertheless, courts often ignore
this distinction.
To better calibrate the deference due administrative agencies on
political-authority grounds, courts should once again consider some norms
from administrative law.266 After all, much ordinary administrative law has its

263. Cf. id. at 149 (“Valid institutional comparison calls upon courts to function when they
can do a better job than the alternative . . . . More than other decision-makers, [judges] can be
expected to evenhandedly and carefully . . . consider essential institutional realities.”); Joshua P.
Booth & Larry I. Palmer, ERISA Preemption Doctrine as Health Policy, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 69–
70 (2010) (“Where a judge sees the courts as having little capability to decide important issues,
the judge is likely to take a more formal approach to interpretation, leaving policy issues to the
legislature. If, however, a judge perceives that the legislative and executive branches are either
unable or unwilling to actively address policy questions, we might expect that judge to take a
more active and inclusive approach to interpretation.”).
264. See BICKEL, supra note 99, at 16–17 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of
the prevailing majority, but against it.”).
265. See Berger, Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 43 (arguing that judicial review is often
“premised on political authority”); Horwitz, supra note 12, at 1078 (arguing that courts defer
typically for “reasons of legal authority” (emphasis omitted)).
266. See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2058–67.
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roots in constitutional law,267 so it makes sense that those constitutionally
inspired administrative principles would help the Court flesh out the
deference owed to administrative actions subject to constitutional
challenge.268 Current doctrine, indeed, sometimes acknowledges that
agencies potentially lack political accountability. For example, courts
sometimes look to the precision of congressional guidance to the agency
before determining the legitimacy of the agency action. The unelected
agency takes its instructions from the elected legislature, so the clarity of the
legislative mandate can help courts determine the strength of the link
between politically accountable officials and agency action.269 Wellestablished doctrine, thus, requires that Congress delegate with a sufficiently
“intelligible principle.”270 By contrast, overly broad delegation requires little
thought from elected officials, who can order an agency to address areas the
legislature lacks the political stomach to address.271 When policies result
from such vague delegations, the responsible agencies, lacking a sufficient
connection to the elected legislature, are less democratically legitimate and
deserve less deference.272
Courts already consider these issues when they invoke “nondelegation
canons,” under which they limit agencies’ ability to take constitutionally

267. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 479, 490–97 (2010) (explaining the constitutional roots of much ordinary
administrative law).
268. The principles addressed here should apply to federal court review of both federal and
state administrative agencies. Even though federal courts could not strike down state agency
action as ultra vires, due process principles should allow courts to examine procedures
increasing the likelihood of constitutional violations. See, e.g., Berger, Administrative Law Norms,
supra note 12, at 2077–79 (relying on due process principles to argue that federal courts can
look at administrative law principles to calibrate deference to both state and federal
administrative agencies); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV.
518, 551 (1970) (arguing that to protect constitutional rights adequately, “courts must
thoroughly evaluate every aspect of the procedural system which protects those rights”).
269. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369, 374 (1989) (describing modern legislation as instructions to administrative agencies).
270. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
271. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 133
(1980) (noting that “policy direction” is what should be required of legislatures); HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF
STANDARDS 21–22 (1962) (“[E]ven if a statute telling an agency ‘Here is the problem: deal with
it’ be deemed to comply with the letter of [the Constitution], it hardly does with the spirit.”).
272. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down:
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2129 (2008) (arguing that the
Constitution vests decision-making authority in Congress rather than agencies); Berger,
Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2033–35 (arguing that courts should offer more
deference to agencies adhering to administrative law norms); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545–46 (2000) (noting that despite agencies’
considerable power, they “are not directly accountable to the electorate”).
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suspect actions without clear congressional authorization.273 While the
nondelegation doctrine is usually highly deferential to Congress with regard
to whether Congress may delegate authority,274 the Court uses
nondelegation canons to limit agency authority, for example, to promulgate
retroactive rules or preempt state law, even though Congress itself could
pass statutes to the same effects.275 Given that the Court constrains
administrative authority when agencies, acting without clear congressional
authorization, tread closely to certain constitutional boundaries, it should at
least inspect the specificity of the legislative delegation in considering
whether to defer to those agencies. Failure to consider the scope of the
delegation would be tantamount to silently conferring upon agencies the
same political authority the legislature enjoys.
Courts can also gauge an agency’s democratic legitimacy by considering
both the internal and external oversight of the relevant agency action. In
our vast public bureaucracy, many government departments are so large that
officials several steps removed from the chief executive’s political appointees
heading the department wield significant policymaking authority.276
Consequently, to preserve political accountability, it is important to maintain
a link both between the agency head and elected officials and among the
various layers of administrative bureaucracy. Where some politically
accountable entity maintains genuine oversight of an agency, the resulting
agency action should have greater presumptive democratic legitimacy—and
therefore be entitled to more deference—than when there is minimal
oversight. Similarly, when the relevant agency policy emanates from far
down the chain-of-command, courts should inquire whether agency
superiors, including the legislative delegatee, have overseen the creation and
implementation of the challenged policy.277 While such attention to

273. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000)
(discussing a set of nondelegation canons which “forbid administrative agencies from making
decisions on their own”).
274. See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474 (“In the history of the Court we have found the
requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two statutes . . . .”).
275. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009) (rejecting preemption claim in
part “[b]ecause Congress has not authorized the FDA to pre-empt state law directly”); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“[A] statutory grant of legislative
rulemaking authority will not . . . be understood to encompass the power to promulgate
retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms.”); Ernest A.
Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1549, 1603–06 (2000) (discussing nondelegation canons as a way to enforce
constitutional values).
276. See STRAUSS, supra note 78, at 130 (explaining that “the detailed understanding and
actual implementation of [many agency] programs occurs . . . at some remove from the
political appointees”).
277. Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–32 (2001) (“[T]he terms of the
congressional delegation give no indication that Congress meant to delegate authority to
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executive control over agencies has limitations and may even sometimes
threaten administrative epistemic authority,278 examining internal agency
hierarchy would help ensure accountability by encouraging the agency head,
who is sometimes directly answerable to the chief executive, to participate in
important decisions.279 Such an approach helps promote political
accountability by establishing a link between the public and the
administrative bureaucracy.280
Courts should also consider the transparency of an agency’s policies in
assessing its political authority. Government accountability is premised on
popular monitoring of government activities; if the people cannot know
what their government is doing, accountability is severely compromised.281
The risk of inadequate transparency is especially high in the agency setting,
where officials are often unelected and where the bureaucratic hierarchy
and technical subject matter can hide a department’s affairs from public
scrutiny.282 Quite often the general public has little idea what agencies
actually do.283 While this is probably impossible to eliminate, transparency
allows the people and legislators to monitor agency action more closely.
Given that transparency is generally important in our administrative
structure, it should also be relevant to courts’ deference determinations in

Customs to issue classification rulings with the force of law.”); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan,
Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 201–02 (arguing Chevron deference
should hinge on whether statutory delegatees make decisions themselves or delegate such
decisions).
278. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 503–15 (2003) (arguing that excessive attention to
presidential control shortchanges problems of agency arbitrariness).
279. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 277, at 237–40. Generally, agency heads are
considered more politically accountable when they are removable by the chief executive. Cf.
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (2010)
(invalidating dual for-cause limitations on President’s authority to remove Board members).
280. See Kagan, supra note 242, at 2331–46 (arguing that the presidential control model
enhances agency accountability in various ways); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1994) (contending that greater
presidential authority over the administrative state will enhance accountability of agencies).
281. See ELY, supra note 271, at 125 (“[P]opular choice will mean relatively little if we don’t
know what our representatives are up to.”); Peter M. Shane, Legislative Delegation, the Unitary
Executive, and the Legitimacy of the Administrative State, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 108 (2010)
(“The essence of accountability lies in the transparency of government actions . . . .”).
282. See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1271
(2009) (“Not only are most voters unlikely to know or care about most administrative decisions,
but they will routinely have difficulty accurately gauging responsibility for those decisions that
subsequently prove unpopular.”).
283. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency
Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 448 (2010) (“[T]he American public generally knows little
about even those regulatory initiatives that most directly affect their interests.”).
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individual rights cases involving administrative agencies.284 Secretive
administrative practices are less connected to the general public and thus
should enjoy less presumptive democratic legitimacy than transparent ones.
Courts should adjust the deference they accord agencies based on how open
and forthcoming the agency was when enacting the challenged policy.
Courts, of course, should treat transparency—like other factors—with
common sense and flexibility. Secrecy may be desirable and therefore more
justifiable in certain contexts, such as national security.285 But absent a
compelling government interest in secrecy, courts should review more
skeptically policies designed behind closed doors.
It may not always be possible to calibrate any of these continuums—
delegation, oversight, or transparency—perfectly.286 Courts using an
institutional-analysis approach will need to make judgment calls, which,
admittedly, will inject uncertainty into their deference determinations. But
courts currently often make such determinations without examining any
factors carefully or systematically. However imperfect, close consideration of
how agencies actually do their job is surely preferable to the status quo.
3. Institutional Analysis of Special Governmental Institutions and
Governmental Institutions Acting in Special Contexts
Finally, the Court should more carefully scrutinize the justifications for
offering heightened deference to particular governmental institutions and
in special contexts. Rather than simply announcing that the government
deserves deference when it acts through particular institutions, like prisons,
or in particular contexts, like national security, the Court should examine if
and why those institutions and contexts merit special respect. Deference in
such situations may still be warranted, but would at least have a stronger
theoretical foundation. As Professor Chesney explains in the context of
national-security deference:
The government contends—and courts frequently agree—that the
executive branch as an institution has a comparative advantage
over the judiciary in terms of producing accurate judgments when
it comes to at least some national security matters. Unfortunately,
discussions of comparative accuracy all too often treat this inquiry
superficially. Courts at times frame this question in a simplistic
284. See Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line
Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 924–25 (1999) (discussing the connection between
transparency and accountability); Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV.
737, 755 (2004) (noting that “accountability requires transparency”).
285. See, e.g., Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security
Dilemma, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 51, 89–121 (2012) (discussing rationales for secrecy in
agencies charged with protecting national security); infra Part II.B.3.
286. See infra Part III.B.1.
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manner, with “the executive” and “the judiciary” treated in
unrealistically monolithic terms, and “accuracy” itself examined
without reference to its constituent elements. A more appropriate
inquiry would account for a number of complicating
considerations . . . .287
In particular, the Court should not simply justify special deference on
the judiciary’s relative epistemic deficit.288 As discussed above, courts’
epistemic deficiency is certainly not unique to the national-security context,
and blind deference on this basis fails to consider whether the government
was even acting with any proficiency worthy of deference. As the HLP dissent
pointed out, for instance, Congress failed to point to any “empirical
information that might convincingly support”289 the criminalization of
speech used to train members of covered groups “on how to use
humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes” and “how
to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for
relief.”290 Thus, even if we accept the majority view in HLP that the political
branches are more knowledgeable than courts about national-security issues,
courts still should confirm that those branches have in fact utilized that
knowledge.
Looking beyond epistemic authority, there are other rationales to justify
the Court’s special deference in these contexts. These likely would make
sense in some cases but not others. For example, the government probably
does have good reasons to keep some material secret due to nationalsecurity concerns. However, the force of this argument would depend on the
particular context and the strength of the government’s contention that
secrecy is essential.291 Moreover, even where the need for secrecy is
compelling, it is not clear that judicial deference is the proper response.292
Where the disclosure of information could potentially aid foreign enemies,
judicial procedures can be shaped to minimize those risks, such as through

287. Chesney, supra note 130, at 1404–05 (footnotes omitted).
288. See id. at 1411 (“Superior access to information or expertise contributes nothing to
accuracy, after all, unless the decisionmaker actually exploits them, and does so reliably.”).
289. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2735 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
290. Id. at 2729 (majority opinion) (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552
F.3d 916, 921 n.1 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010)).
291. See generally SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION
172–75 (1982) (arguing that while some governmental secrecy is “evil,” some is also justified);
Athan G. Theorharis, Introduction to A CULTURE OF SECRECY: THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE
PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW 4–13 (Athan G. Theorharis ed., 1998) (discussing culture of
government secrecy in national-security issues).
292. See Chesney, supra note 130, at 1427–28.
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in camera presentations of evidence to judges,293 as in the Pentagon Papers
case.294 If constitutional rights can be litigated and vindicated without the
public disclosure of sensitive information, secrecy is not a sound reason to
defer.295
Another justification for heightened deference in both the prison and
national-security contexts is that the stakes for the country’s safety are just so
high that we are less willing to tolerate judicial second-guessing of the
political branches’ expertise.296 This argument, obviously, is more
convincing in some contexts than others. Clearly, prison safety should be
taken seriously, but if special deference rests substantially on the potential
harm that could come to the public from overly intrusive judicial review,
prisons probably deserve less deference than, say, agencies protecting the
nation from calamitous terrorist attacks. Moreover, even though prison
security certainly is a matter of public concern, some litigated issues
presumably have only minimal impact on prison security. To be sure, some
requirements of prison officials may be particularly onerous or intrusive, but
such an argument calls for a case-by-case deference analysis rather than a
separate category of special deference.
The “high stakes” justification for deference presumably would have
greater traction when government plausibly could be said to be taking
measures necessary to protect the national security. Such judgment calls
nevertheless pose difficulties, because the government often invokes
national security liberally, such as in Boumediene,297 where the actual impact

293. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (stating that courts may issue protective orders).
294. See United States v. N.Y. Times Co. (Pentagon Papers), 328 F. Supp. 324, 326 (S.D.N.Y.)
(referencing “in camera” proceedings at which the government presented sensitive material),
rev’d, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.) (en banc), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
295. See, e.g., Moberly, supra note 285 (discussing rationales for secrecy in agencies charged
with protecting national security); Thomas G. Stacy, The Constitution in Conflict: Espionage
Prosecutions, the Right To Present a Defense, and the State Secrets Privilege, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 177,
245–53 (1987) (“Closure of those portions of the trial touching on national security
secrets . . . protects the government’s national security interests and a defendant’s right to
present a defense, obviat[ing] the necessity for making impossible choices between security and
liberty.”); cf. Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National
Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 92–93 (1992)
(“Judicial deference to agency claims that disclosure of information will cause damage to
national security serves the public interest only if the results in actual cases inspire confidence
that such deference is, in fact, justified. If the information that is ultimately revealed (either
through litigation or negotiation) turns out to be obviously inconsequential, the public
confidence in executive arguments for secrecy will be eroded.”).
296. See supra Part I.A.3; cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (declining to find a
“political question” because deciding the case on the merits would not, inter alia, risk “grave
disturbance at home”).
297. See Brief for the Respondents at 45–46, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)
(No. 06-1195, No. 06-1196), 2007 WL 2972541, at *45–46 (arguing for “highly circumscribed”
review and deference to the military tribunal).
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on national security was questionable. While the Court may not always strike
the perfect balance, more careful attention to the specific institution and
context should help it determine whether an asserted threat to national
security requires deference.298
Interestingly, though these concerns are rarely addressed directly,
perhaps the Court silently (or even unwittingly) accounted for them in
Boumediene. Focusing on the potential threat to the nation in that case, it
seems implausible that affording detainees after six years the opportunity to
challenge their detention in limited federal court proceedings will impact
the national security.299 Thus, whereas the government could reasonably
contend in some other cases that an adverse ruling may hinder military
preparedness or aid enemies of the United States, those arguments seemed
far less plausible in Boumediene and other enemy-combatant-detainee
cases.300 Indeed, Boumediene’s question was quite narrow, implicating only
access to habeas jurisdiction, not the subsequent questions of how courts
should consider the detainees’ challenges. Some commentators, in fact,
have argued persuasively that the D.C. Circuit’s post-Boumediene rulings have
eviscerated the procedural right recognized in that case, especially given the
Supreme Court’s recent refusal to review subsequent appellate decisions on
the issue.301
For better or worse, then, Boumediene offered the detainees so little that
the national-security stakes seem extremely modest. From this perspective,
perhaps the Court denied deference because it concluded that special “high
stakes” deference was not warranted.302 In any event, a more searching
institutional inquiry and a more candid evaluation of the gravity of the issues
at stake would help the Court calibrate an appropriate level of deference in
arguably special contexts.303

298. See Chesney, supra note 130, at 1426 (arguing that some potential disruptions to
national security “are more serious than others”).
299. If anything, one could even argue that permitting continued detention without legal
hearing would perpetuate a Kafka-esque legal system that may weaken American legitimacy
abroad and inadvertently assist al-Qaeda recruiting. But see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 827–28
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s decision “will almost certainly cause more
Americans to be killed”).
300. Chesney, supra note 130, at 1427–28.
301. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741
(2012); Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739
(2012); Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451,
1455–56 (2011) (arguing that several D.C. Circuit judges have subverted the Supreme Court’s
Boumediene decision).
302. It is doubtful that striking down the statute at issue in HLP would have created any
more tangible a threat, but at least the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan and Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam were active organizations that engaged in terrorist activity.
303. See Chesney, supra note 130, at 1432–34 (proposing a more detailed and coherent
approach to deference in national-security cases).
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* * *
Collectively, the issues discussed here should guide whether the relevant
political actor deserves judicial deference. If we are to take courts’ stated
justifications for deference seriously, courts should examine the institutions
more critically within the contexts posed by particular cases before deciding
whether to defer or not. Deference, of course, is not the entire
constitutional inquiry, but it is a portion of the inquiry that should be
approached with far greater care.
C. THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN PRACTICE
Courts applying these factors in constitutional cases will need to
determine when and how rigorously to review the government procedures at
issue. One could imagine a variety of approaches for determining when
courts should defer. At one extreme, courts could review government
processes and fact-findings as a preliminary inquiry in every case. At the
other extreme, courts could examine government processes only if the
plaintiff has made a threshold showing that there is good reason to question
the government’s diligence and rigor. Similarly, one can imagine a spectrum
with respect to how carefully the court would review what the relevant
political branch actually did, ranging from highly deferential review to an
intrusive, de novo inquiry.
The institutional analysis proposed here takes a middle ground,
demanding that courts ask these questions in every case and engage in a
hard-look review of the legislative or administrative record.304 Under this
approach, litigants could examine the administrative or legislative record
closely to see how carefully the relevant policy was designed.305 Where such
analysis suggests serious procedural inadequacies, or where substantial gaps
in the record make it difficult to know how the policy was actually created,
then further discovery, such as depositions and document requests, could be
permitted.306 Such discovery would be especially useful in cases involving
304. See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (arguing
that the court’s “supervisory function” calls on it to intervene if “the agency has not really taken
a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decisionmaking” (footnote omitted)).
305. Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983). In some cases where an administrative agency acts in secrecy without good
reason, greater discovery would be permissible. See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note
12, at 2065–67.
306. For example, in Taylor v. Crawford, after earlier discovery had demonstrated problems
in the State’s lethal injection procedures, the judge permitted further discovery into Missouri’s
internal procedures, including a deposition of the execution team leader. See Taylor v.
Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006)
(discussing the order granting motion to depose John Doe 1), rev’d, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir.
2007); supra notes 252–58 and accompanying text.

A1_BERGER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

DEFERENCE DETERMINATIONS

12/19/2012 11:05 AM

519

agencies, like departments of corrections, universities, the military, and
prosecutors’ offices, which often operate outside traditional administrative
law requirements.307 Indeed, because those kinds of agencies are more likely
to craft policy without the constraints of likely arbitrary-and-capricious
judicial review,308 more careful constitutional review is especially important
in these cases. As for agencies already subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) or state equivalents, this approach would ensure that
courts in constitutional cases make deference determinations with reference
to the kinds of factors they review in administrative law cases.
Unlike a regime permitting detailed preliminary, de novo inquiries into
government procedures in every case, the institutional-analysis approach
would only marginally disrupt current judicial practices and would not raise
the separation-of-powers concerns that more extensive intrusions into
congressional and executive procedures might pose. Both legislatures and
agencies usually keep detailed records of their proceedings,309 and far from
invading those branches’ autonomy, scrutiny of such records should inform
judicial deference. While this more modest approach may not catch all
troubling procedural flaws, it would help attune courts, government actors,
and litigants to these important issues. Significantly, under this approach,
courts could not so easily issue stealth deference determinations that
summarily grant or deny deference without first examining the factual and
theoretical premises underlying that determination.
Of course, the precise contours of the analysis would differ from case to
case, but, significantly, in no case would the courts be dictating procedures
to the other branches of government. Courts would only be determining
whether the procedures at issue merited deference, and even if they did not
defer, the government action could still be constitutional.310 Unlike
procedural due process cases where procedural shortfalls themselves
amount to a violation,311 courts engaging in these institutional analyses
would consider procedural issues primarily to determine whether the

307. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.03 (West 2005) (exempting the University of
Minnesota from Minnesota’s APA); MO. ANN. STAT. § 536.010(6)(k) (West 2009) (exempting a
“statement concerning only inmates of an institution under the control of the department of
corrections” from the APA’s definition of a “rule”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(12)(G) (2011)
(exempting from the APA “[s]tatements concerning inmates of a correctional . . . facility”);
Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 993 (2006)
(“[T]he government faces almost no institutional checks when it proceeds in criminal
matters.”); Vermeule, supra note 236, at 1096 (explaining that much agency action escapes
meaningful administrative law review); infra Part III.B.2.
308. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
309. See, e.g., id. § 552 (providing for public availability of agency procedures).
310. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (stating test for
determining what process is due).
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government acted carefully enough to deserve the benefit of the doubt. This
approach still leaves government actors wide leeway to conduct their
business while simultaneously making clear that courts will not defer to
them without first assessing how those actors perform their jobs.
III. ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS
A. ADVANTAGES OF INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
1. Incentivizing Responsible Law Making
The institutional-analysis approach would serve several important
purposes. Perhaps most obviously, it would provide incentives for
policymakers to act with more careful attention to their own expertise and
democratic legitimacy. Though legislatures and administrative agencies
differ in most important respects, in theory both often are in a better
position than courts to understand technical policy areas. Judicial attention
to whether policymakers actually possess and utilize their supposed
epistemic authority would make it more likely that they would try to gather
and use facts more responsibly. Similarly, judicial attention to questions of
democratic legitimacy would incentivize legislatures to build oversight and
transparency mechanisms into agencies. While these norms are not always
observed, they should play a prominent role in our system of representative
government in which many issues are delegated to unelected officials.312 Of
course, this incentive would likely differ across actors and contexts, but
generally speaking, most policymakers would be inclined to act in a manner
more likely to trigger judicial deference.
Presumably, this attention to government procedures would sometimes
result in better designed policy.313 As Barbara Sinclair has noted, “a good
process will, on average and over the long run, produce better policy.”314
Political science and empirical research further suggests that poor political
processes often result in flawed policy, vindicating interest group rentseeking and distorting policy outcomes.315 Congress does sometimes

312. See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir. of Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf (directing executive departments
and agencies to implement “principles of transparency”).
313. See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 196, at 1928–29.
314. Barbara Sinclair, Spoiling the Sausages? How a Polarized Congress Deliberates and Legislates,
in 2 RED AND BLUE NATION?: CONSEQUENCES AND CORRECTION OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED
POLITICS 55, 83 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
315. See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 196, at 1928–29 (summarizing political science
literature exploring the connections between government procedures and resulting policies).
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carefully examine evidence to help it find a proper policy solution316 but,
with an agenda often driven by interest groups and lobbyists, Congress often
knows its preferred outcome before it looks at anything.317 An institutionalanalysis approach would alert Congress that its factual findings will receive
more judicial respect when it has actually considered evidence carefully
rather than conducted sham proceedings to reach political ends.318
To be sure, some legislators will still attempt to use the system to make
political statements rather than craft meaningful policy, and some may not
even care if courts invalidate those policies. That being said, at least on the
margins, linking deference to deliberateness should help encourage more
responsible policymaking. While courts may not always be able to perfectly
distinguish careful policymaking from self-serving, politically motivated
factual manipulation, most judges are not entirely naïve about how Congress
operates.319 Accordingly, the legislative record will often give courts a better
sense of whether and how Congress utilized its institutional capacity to
examine the problem at hand.320 As for administrative action, this approach
should also help improve agency processes, especially for agencies otherwise
escaping administrative review.321

316. See, e.g., Benjamin Michael Superfine, New Directions in School Funding and Governance:
Moving from Politics to Evidence, 98 KY. L.J. 653, 678–85 (2010) (discussing congressional use of
scientific and empirical evidence in its development of educational policy).
317. See Laycock, supra note 216, at 1175 (“[Legislative legitimacy] assumes that legislators
are free to investigate the public good and to vote their consciences. Sometimes they are. But
often they are locked into positions by ideology or political pressure before the hearing ever
begins.”).
318. See supra Part II.B.1.
319. Cf. Pablo T. Spiller & Matthew L. Spitzer, Where Is the Sin in Sincere? Sophisticated
Manipulataion of Sincere Judicial Voters (with Applications to Other Voting Environments), 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 32, 32–36 (1995) (arguing that many judges are sophisticated political actors).
320. Numerous theories of legislation exist, some nearly diametrically opposed. Legislators
may be public-minded policymakers sincerely trying to further public good, or alternatively,
special interests’ tools that only care about raising money for reelection. See LESSIG, supra note
213, at 89–171 (describing how the demand for campaign cash consumes most legislators and
skews policy); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224, 230 (1986) (explaining
public-choice theory of Congress in which special interest groups create strong incentives for
politicians to enact legislation favorable to them); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary
in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1245 (1989) (“‘[P]ublic
interest’ theorists posit that legislators adopt regulatory legislation to further the public
interest.”). Obviously, Congress’s responsiveness to the incentives provided by the theory of
deference proposed here will hinge partially on which theory of legislation is more accurate.
The competing theories all shed helpful light on how Congress operates, though some theories
may be more illustrative for particular legislators and during particular Congresses than others.
Still, to the extent that legislators sometimes seek good public policy, the institutional-analysis
approach should help provide better incentives for careful fact-finding. Cf. Araiza, supra note
21, at 22–37 (offering principles of deference to congressional fact-finding).
321. See supra notes 236–38, 307 and accompanying text.
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The current system does not consistently provide these incentives.
Under the status quo, legislatures and other political actors do not know if
courts will respect their factual findings and other judgments.322 Nor do they
know when their actions will trigger judicial respect in constitutional cases.
The institutional-analysis approach places clearer expectations on political
actors, incentivizing them to act with proper political and epistemic
authority, which should, in turn, improve governmental performance.323
2. Promoting Democracy
Relatedly, attention to the processes of political institutions can also
help promote democracy.324 Administrative agencies, in particular, lack
presumptive democratic legitimacy, and it is in this context that the
institutional-analysis approach can improve the government’s democratic
legitimacy most significantly. The Court in constitutional cases sometimes
treats administrative agencies’ political authority as static and roughly
comparable to that of the legislature or chief executive.325 In reality, though,
agency political authority varies considerably, hinging on various factors like
legislative guidance, oversight, and transparency.326
When agencies receive clear congressional instructions and proper
oversight, they are more directly answerable to the people and thus enjoy
greater democratic legitimacy. Similarly, when an agency operates
transparently, the public is much better positioned to observe agency action
and make better-informed assessments of the government’s performance. By
linking deference more closely to actual accountability, courts could provide
better incentives for agencies otherwise escaping judicial review to behave
more responsibly. These incentives would also encourage legislatures to
delegate to agencies more precisely and to monitor agency actions more
closely.
Increased judicial attention to the behavior of governmental institutions
should, then, provide incentives for greater democratic responsiveness from
these governmental bodies. Whereas many critics consider substantive
constitutional review problematic because it permits unelected judges to
322. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 87, 147 (2001) (noting that legislative-record review provides no guidance for anticipating
how a challenge will be resolved).
323. See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 196, at 1928–31 (reasoning that adherence to the rules
governing the legislative process—procedures that legitimize a legislature’s decisions—
produces better laws and more accurate policy).
324. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 112, at 38–43.
325. See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2034 (“[T]he Court downplays
the constitutional ‘who,’ effectively treating the legislature, chief executive, and administrative
officials all as roughly equivalent incarnations of ‘the government’ with the same democratic
legitimacy.”); supra Part I.A.2.b.
326. See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2059–67.
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displace the legislature’s majoritarian will,327 a focus on institutional
processes can enhance democratic rule. For example, if courts paid closer
attention to the identity of political actors, they might be less likely to defer
reflexively to administrative agencies—at least to agencies lacking proper
guidance, oversight, and transparency. Current judicial practices often treat
agencies similarly to legislatures in constitutional cases, even though elected
legislatures should enjoy greater democratic legitimacy than unelected
agency bureaucrats.328 Greater attention to the identity and behavior of the
government actor could help avoid that unnecessary conflation.
While this approach is likely to provide a stronger incentive for better
democratic accountability in agencies by improving transparency and
oversight, even attention to legislative processes could help further majority
rule. As Professor Bar-Siman-Tov has argued, “The rules that govern the
legislative process . . . are designed to ensure that the laws produced by the
legislature reflect the will of the majority of its members . . . .”329 Moreover,
attention to legislative procedures can help foster transparency, thus
providing citizens a way to observe the political process and increase
democratic legitimacy.330 Of course, legislative representatives are already
elected and directly answerable to the people, so, to this extent, they are
already usually more politically accountable than most administrative
officials. Nevertheless, at least in the context of legislative fact-finding,
improved attention to legislative processes should help encourage the
legislature to find facts with more rigorous and transparent methods that
can be scrutinized not just by courts but the public at large.
3. Promoting Legal Consistency and Predictability
Institutional analyses would also help imbue courts’ deference
determinations with greater predictability, rendering those determinations
less “stealthy.” Linking deference determinations to the way the institution
in question actually behaves would make it easier to follow the Court’s
reasoning by connecting the ostensible reasons for deference with the actual
deference determination. Even more importantly, a more careful approach
would help give clearer guidance to lower courts and parties for
approaching such problems. Without such guidance, lower courts are left
uncertain about how to approach questions of fact and democratic
legitimacy. Given that constitutional adjudication often turns on factual
considerations and decisions about courts’ relationships to the other
branches of government, the Court has left lower courts ill-prepared to

327.
328.
329.
330.

See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 99, at 16–23.
See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2032–33, 2059–61.
Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 196, at 1934.
See id. at 1934–35.
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properly address important questions about deference on significant issues
that recur in many constitutional cases.331
Engaging in institutional analyses, then, should result in greater
constitutional clarity. Legal clarity, of course, is important not just so that
the law is understandable and predictable,332 but also because these types of
stealth determinations implicate important constitutional questions.
Constitutional law contains multiple, sometimes contradictory, values,333 and
the Court often tries to resolve these conflicts by concluding that one
doctrine trumps another, without fully wrestling with the broader
underlying tensions,334 many of which arise through stealth determinations.
Too often, stealth deference determinations receive attention only as
litigation strategies, rather than more fundamental debates about who
should decide important questions. Addressing these determinations more
directly will help force judges to engage with deeper structural issues about
how our Constitution allocates decision-making power.335
Closer attention to these issues may also improve black-letter
constitutional doctrine. While generally more predictable than most stealth
determinations, doctrinal inquiries, too, can be maddeningly erratic.336
Some of this doctrinal muddiness, though, is closely tied to stealth
determinations. As discussed above, Grutter and Gratz collectively hold that
individualized, rather than mechanical, affirmative action admissions
policies are more likely to pass constitutional muster, but together the cases
send mixed signals about whether courts should respect universities’
judgments about the benefits of racial diversity and the need for affirmative
action plans to achieve those benefits.337 More explicit deference
determinations (and other determinations of this nature) would hardly

331. See FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 3 (“[T]he Court’s failure to account for the empirical
world makes its decisions, at best, broadly aspirational, rather than specifically directional.”);
supra note 181–82 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 169–74, 181–84 and accompanying text.
333. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 605, 633 (1981) (“[T]he Constitution itself contains a multiplicity of various sorts of
values, many in tension with each other: process values as well as substantive values, structural
and institutional values as well as those embodying individual rights.”); Martha Minow, Choice or
Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare as We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493, 497–98
(1999) (recognizing the multiplicity of the Constitution’s values, and noting they “are not
simply distinct and competing; they are also linked and interdependent”).
334. See, e.g., Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 593 (2006).
335. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 106 (2004)
(arguing that many of our debates about political morality are couched in constitutional
terms).
336. See SEGALL, supra note 23, at 21–166 (summarizing numerous doctrinal
inconsistencies).
337. See supra notes 161–68 and accompanying text.
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eliminate all problems with black-letter constitutional doctrine, but they
would address some of these inconsistencies, clarifying how deference
should interact with substantive doctrine.
4. Encouraging Judicial Candor
Institutional analyses would also encourage courts to offer more
thorough, candid explanations for their deference determinations. Judicial
candor may not be the Court’s priority these days, but it seems especially
lacking when the Court makes deference and other stealth determinations.
As discussed above, the Court makes these determinations with even fewer
constraints than when it makes “doctrinal” decisions, so it is unsurprising
that the Court provides little explanation. But judicial explanation and
candor are essential if we are to have confidence in the judiciary’s
constitutional decisions. As H. Jefferson Powell argues:
[C]andor is essential if the justices . . . are to ask the rest of us to
take them seriously where they cannot claim that their judgments
are beyond dispute. Only if you and I understand the true grounds
of a decision can we assent to its correctness or . . . to its validity as
the outcome of our system even though we think it wrong in
substance. . . . Candor is indispensable if the system is to retain its
moral dignity . . . . The constitutional virtue of candor, therefore,
goes beyond honesty about the meaning of cases and sincerity in
the statement of viewpoint. It is the disposition to seek, and so far
as possible to achieve, a congruity between the mind grappling with
the constitutional issue before it and the language in which that
struggle and its resolution is expressed . . . .338
Given that there is rarely a clearly “correct” answer in constitutional law and
that reasonable people can disagree about the proper resolution of many
constitutional cases, courts’ decisions in such cases often hinge on value
judgments as much as legal principles.339 In a system where important
questions are left to judicial tribunals and where the practical constraints on
those tribunals are limited, it is probably inevitable that judges and justices
would confront constitutional cases with a range of approaches and
values.340 What is regrettable is not that justices take such different

338. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF
JUDICIAL DECISION 90 (2008); see also SEGALL, supra note 23, at 3 (discussing judicial candor).
339. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 891 (1988)
(“[O]ften two or more outcomes will be reasonable, and the choice among reasonable
outcomes is an open one . . . .”).
340. See SEGALL, supra note 23, at 4 (“When the Justices give meaning to phrases like equal
protection of the law and due process of law, they are employing their own ideas of right and wrong
formed by personal life experiences, not interpreting prior law.”); Posner, supra note 19, at 40–
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approaches, but rather the justices’ pretention that their answer is
objectively correct.341
As they currently exist, judicial deference determinations are so
unconstrained that justices can quietly turn to them to help shape the
outcome of a case, even when doctrinal factors may point in a different
direction.342 Moreover, the Court’s approach to issues like epistemic
authority and congressional findings is often a pretext for vindicating other
values, like federalism in Morrison or anti-abortion sentiment in Gonzales v.
Carhart.343 Requiring courts to consider institutional factors may not
necessarily result in a drastic change in how cases are resolved, but it would
at least force judges to identify these factors while determining whether to
defer. To the extent these factors sometimes conflict with one another, the
Court would also have to candidly explain why it finds some more
convincing than others, rather than simply ignoring inconvenient factors
altogether.
No approach will eliminate a judge’s discretion to ignore inconvenient
factors at will. However, given that the institutional capacities of the other
branches necessarily underlie many constitutional judgments, thorough
institutional analyses should help improve courts’ consistency and honesty in
approaching such issues. Courts’ failure to openly and consistently address
deference determinations obscures important conversations about each
branch’s proper role in making factual determinations and constitutional
pronouncements that are binding on us all. Improving the dialogue between
courts and the political branches will foster a much-needed investigation
into who should appropriately make certain kinds of constitutional
determinations.344 Institutional analyses would also help improve the
public’s faith in the judiciary, which suffers when the people suspect that
judges may not believe their own explanations.345 Finally, greater Supreme
Court candor and rigor would help guide lower courts trying to make their
own deference determinations.

41 (“[I]t is rarely possible to say with a straight face of a Supreme Court constitutional decision
that it was decided correctly or incorrectly.”).
341. Cf. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 7 (1930) (arguing that “[m]uch of the
uncertainty of law is . . . of immense social value” (emphasis omitted)).
342. See supra Part I.A.
343. See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 322, at 159–60.
344. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993); cf.
STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 363–
64 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing structural requirements forcing agencies to explain their
decisions).
345. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 743 (1987)
(arguing that judges lose public trust when their opinions are not candid).
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B. THE (LIMITED) LIMITATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
1. The Difficulties of Calibrating Deference
As with any proposal to enhance the efficacy of judicial decision
making, the institutional-analysis approach does have its limitations. Perhaps
the most potent criticism is that judges will not be up to the task of
accurately assessing the institutional characteristics of the political
branches.346 Relatedly, courts’ ability to assess their own institutional
strengths vis-à-vis the political branches will likely vary. Even in ideal
circumstances, accurately calibrating deference to the degree of expertise
and political authority that a policymaker possesses is hardly a science, and
judges themselves have widely varying degrees of political experience and
savvy. From this perspective, the multi-factor institutional analyses proposed
here may be clumsily applied, thus giving judges too much flexibility to
manipulate the outcome of a case.
It is, however, worth emphasizing that judges today make deference
determinations anyway without any consistent guiding principles.
Institutional analysis is an improvement over the status quo insofar as it
forces courts to identify and explain factors that should constrain their own
decision making, thus encouraging greater judicial consistency. Admittedly,
the sheer volume of relevant factors will result in some inconsistency, but
merely theorizing deference better would be an improvement. By contrast,
the Court’s current approach to deference sometimes just announces a
conclusion without offering much legal analysis at all.
Of course, if consistency were the only goal, this inquiry would be rather
simple: courts could just always defer to the political branches in
constitutional cases, or, alternatively, always engage in de novo review. Both
approaches are too extreme. The former renders judicial review largely
ineffective in many circumstances, and the latter fails to recognize that the
political branches sometimes do enjoy epistemic or political authority worthy
of respect. Given that the Constitution’s text does not provide clear
guidance on how to approach these institutional questions, it makes sense
that the various branches’ institutional strengths and weaknesses should play
a role in deference determinations. The problem with the status quo is that
these institutional factors are not considered more carefully and
systematically, but an entirely deferential or undeferential approach would
not consider them at all. In other words, a one-size-fits-all solution to
deference may yield consistency, but it would ignore other important
constitutional values and disrupt current approaches to deference. In
comparison, institutional analysis seems the more practical and harmonious
solution.

346.

See VERMEULE, supra note 194, at 155 (discussing judges’ “bounded rationality”).
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2. Potential Doctrinal Obstacles
Certain legal doctrines could also potentially interfere with institutional
inquiries in some cases. For example, under the APA, the parties must rely
on the administrative record; they are not entitled to discovery into agency
procedures.347 However, those rules only apply in administrative proceedings
and therefore would not necessarily foreclose discovery in civil constitutional
litigation.348 Such discovery may be especially important in constitutional
cases lacking a developed administrative record, such as lethal injection
cases in which departments of corrections sometimes design execution
procedures without adhering to administrative law requirements.349 Indeed,
such discovery may be important in a variety of settings where state
administrative agencies operate outside the ambit of administrative law
requirements and therefore are more likely to utilize inadequate procedures
heightening the risk of constitutional violation.350
Immunity doctrines are another potential doctrinal hurdle, especially in
some suits for money damages. These doctrines often derail a plaintiff’s case
before she can even question how the government devised the challenged
policy. Qualified immunity doctrine, for instance, protects many
governmental officials from monetary liability unless that official’s conduct
violated clearly established law.351 The doctrine therefore often allows a

347. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B)(i) (exempting from initial discovery disclosures
“an action for review on an administrative record”); 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 14.8 (2d ed. 1980) (explaining that the APA contains no discovery provisions
and that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s discovery provisions do not apply to
administrative proceedings).
348. See Michael Asimow & Lisl Dunlop, The Many Faces of Administrative Adjudication in the
European Union, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 135 n.7 (2009) (noting that while discovery rules do
not apply in administrative actions under the APA, they do apply in civil cases).
349. Some states specifically exempt departments of corrections from their administrative
laws. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 536.010(6)(k) (West 2009) (exempting “statement concerning
only inmates of an institution under the control of the department of corrections” from the
definition of a “rule”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(12)(G) (2011) (exempting “[s]tatements
concerning inmates of a correctional . . . detention facility”). Departments of corrections in
other states have similarly tried to develop lethal injection procedures without administrative
law oversight. See Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 731–32 (Ct.
App. 2008) (faulting the State for developing lethal injection procedure without following state
administrative law requirements); Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 33–34 (Md. 2006) (same); see
also supra notes 236, 307 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965) (invalidating film censorship
scheme because it created a significant possibility of discrimination against unpopular speech);
Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 12, at 2049–50, 2077–79; Monaghan, supra note
268, at 551 (arguing that “first amendment rights . . . can be destroyed by insensitive
procedures”).
351. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that governmental
officials’ qualified immunity may be overcome by showing that the officer violated “clearly
established” law, of which a reasonable officer would have known).
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court to dismiss an action on the basis of unsettled law without discovery and
without clarifying the relevant legal norm.352 Such doctrines could thus
preempt a call for institutional analysis, disposing of any need to further
inquire into governmental procedures.
There are, however, ways to allow courts to reach the merits of these
questions without subjecting governmental officials to liability that might
chill their job performance. Importantly, qualified immunity, by its own
terms, does not apply where the official has violated clearly established law,
thus limiting the pool of cases in question. Further, Ex parte Young actions
for prospective injunctive relief do not trigger qualified immunity (or
sovereign immunity), and many constitutional claims are, in fact, brought
for injunctive relief.353 And even in cases where the legal norms are
unsettled, minor tweaks to existing doctrine could help courts resolve these
cases on the merits. For example, as Professor Pfander has argued, by
reviving the common law suit for nominal damages, courts could adjudicate
constitutional questions without exposing governmental officials to actual or
compensatory damages.354 Such an approach would allow litigants to obtain
immunity-free determinations of their constitutional claims without
exposing officials to anything greater than nominal monetary liability.355
Thus, neither qualified immunity doctrine nor the restrictions of
administrative law should pose an insurmountable bar to more thorough
institutional analysis of government action.
3. The Difficulties of Avoiding Value-Based Judging
Ultimately, any attempt to improve constitutional decision making must
confront the criticism that Supreme Court opinions are simply driven by the
justices’ own politics.356 As Professor Segall argues, judges’ criteria in
constitutional cases “are much more about subjectivity and taste than logic

352. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2012) (noting that the defendant
filed a motion to dismiss based on absolute immunity and qualified immunity); James E.
Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1602 (2011).
353. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (noting that qualified
immunity does not apply in actions “to enjoin future conduct, in an action against a
municipality, or in litigating a suppression motion”); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60
(1908) (permitting a suit against a state official for injunctive relief notwithstanding the state’s
immunity from suit); Pfander, supra note 352, at 1609.
354. See Pfander, supra note 352, at 1606–07.
355. Id. at 1607 (“Although it would promise little by way of compensation, such a nominal
damages claim could be an attractive option for plaintiffs who wish to secure a judicial test of
their claims.”).
356. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 19, at 40 (“Constitutional cases . . . can be decided only on
the basis of a political judgment, and a political judgment cannot be called right or wrong by
reference to legal norms.”).
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and reason.”357 Empirical political science scholarship further suggests that
values play a significant role in justices’ votes.358 Moreover, justices
sometimes have incentives to tolerate a poorly theorized determination
within an opinion to keep together a coalition of five votes.359 Consequently,
calls for more rigor and consistency in deference determinations may be
fruitless, because nothing can stop the justices from imposing their own
values in constitutional cases and from failing to elaborate their reasons
when terseness would better serve their strategic aims.360
It is, nevertheless, important to recognize that the Court’s approach to
deference determinations is more ad hoc than to constitutional precedent
more generally. While it is certainly true that many Supreme Court
constitutional decisions seem value driven and inconsistent with
precedent,361 most black-letter constitutional doctrine proceeds with greater
predictability than do deference determinations or other stealth
determinations.362 Constitutional cases in a given doctrinal area usually
purport to ask the same questions, even if they answer the questions in
different, sometimes seemingly irreconcilable, ways.363 By contrast,
deference and other stealth determinations ask no questions consistently.364
However flawed constitutional doctrine may be, deference determinations
would at least become more predictable and law-like if they demanded the
same treatment as doctrinal constitutional inquiries.
This is not to say that more carefully theorized constitutional decision
making would be easy. Even the most talented, earnest justice working in
good faith will inevitably struggle when deciding many constitutional cases.
Supreme Court constitutional cases are often hard, presenting multiple
issues simultaneously and pitting competing constitutional principles against
each other with little textual guidance. Moreover, constitutional opinions
already tend to be too long, and including still more explanation would

357. SEGALL, supra note 23, at 4.
358. See Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis,
20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999) (synthesizing dozens of studies purporting to measure the
connection between judicial ideology and behavior).
359. See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1739 (1995).
360. See Posner, supra note 19, at 40 (arguing that constitutional cases are “not susceptible
of confident evaluation on the basis of professional legal norms”).
361. See generally SEGALL, supra note 23, at 21–166 (providing numerous examples of the
Supreme Court’s failure to follow its own constitutional precedents).
362. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
363. Affirmative action and educational racial preference cases, for instance, purport to
apply strict scrutiny, even if some decisions are difficult to square with each other. See, e.g.,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
364. See supra Part I.A.
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compound this problem further.365 Thus, it is unsurprising that justices
would silently resort to their own values to help resolve close cases. Even a
justice deeply committed to impartiality is likely to answer close legal
questions in accordance with her own worldview.366 Indeed, some attention
to values and norms may actually be necessary in constitutional adjudication,
where the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy may be more threatened by the
judge who neglects cultural values than the one who ignores precedent.367
That being said, justices could also do a better job acknowledging the
difficult tensions many cases present, rather than playing the role of an
advocate intent on making her case. Chief Justice Roberts’ professed view
that deciding cases is like calling “balls and strikes” is symptomatic of a
judicial culture steeped in the conventions of advocacy.368 Lawyers,
particularly litigators, spend their careers presenting their arguments as “the
right answer” and trying to downplay counter-arguments. That litigators do
this is understandable, given their professional obligation to represent their
clients zealously.369 But these lawyers often continue to write this way when
they become judges.370 The result is that most judicial opinions read a good
deal like legal briefs, seeking to prove an argument by emphasizing strong

365. See Elliot E. Slotnick, Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decision Making: Problems and
Prospects, 75 JUDICATURE 128, 132 (1991) (“Supreme Court opinions are not written for a lay or
journalistic audience and justices rarely do anything to make them more accessible to such
publics. Indeed, some jurists seem to go to great lengths to trump complex legal questions with
complexities in their own prose.”). See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE
CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT’S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS
SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND (1992).
366. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324, 345–54 (1990) (discussing the hermeneutical and
practical traditions in legal interpretations and the fact that “different values will pull the
interpreter in different directions”); Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 203–04 (1989) (discussing the effect
that personal views necessarily have on a judge’s decisions).
367. See Post, supra note 44, at 10.
368. See Roberts: “My Job Is To Call Balls and Strikes and Not To Pitch or Bat,” CNN (Sept. 12,
2005), http://articles.cnn.com/2005-09-12/politics/roberts.statement_1_judicial-role-judgesjudicial-oath?_s=PM:POLITICS (“Judges are like umpires. . . . [I]t is a limited role. . . . And I will
remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”); Eric J. Segall, The
Court: A Talk with Judge Richard Posner, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/sep/29/court-talk-judge-richard-posner/?page=2 (discussing
with Judge Posner Chief Justice Roberts’ balls-and-strikes analogy in confirmation hearings).
369. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1986) (“A lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.”).
370. See Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction
Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 85–86 (1998) (“Repeated exposure to adversaries’ arguments,
set up as opposing poles, establish a habit of mind for judges who in turn write opinions as
though they present a preordained correct answer, which embraces by necessity only one
position or viewpoint. Opinions are frequently unequivocal, ignoring ambiguities in the law and
the presence of compelling arguments against the court’s decision.”).
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points and hiding weak ones. To this extent, stealth determinations reflect
not an isolated phenomenon but the essence of a judicial culture in which it
is difficult for the judge to abandon the litigant’s mindset. The tone is
argumentative, not reflective.
Greater reflection may be possible, but it is not easy to attain. Greater
attention to the theoretical underpinnings of stealth determinations—and
to our human inclination to avoid theoretical inquiries that may yield
answers in tension with our own normative views—could help the Court
consider such determinations more earnestly and less strategically.371 This
will not eliminate the problem, but it may encourage judges to engage more
seriously and impartially with deference determinations. It is not easy to
remove values from one’s judicial rulings, but an awareness of one’s natural
propensities to rely on one’s own normative views can help. In sharp
contrast to Chief Justice Roberts’ “balls-and-strikes” comment, then-Judge
David Souter, when asked during his own confirmation hearings whether he
would judge without reference to his own personal values, insightfully
answered that “[w]e have no guarantee of success [of steering clear of our
own values], but we know that the best chance of success comes from being
conscious of the fact that we will be tempted to do otherwise.”372 While
judges will still steer outcomes in directions they prefer, forcing judges to
identify the institutional factors cutting in favor of and against deference can
help improve their self-awareness, the quality of their written opinions, and
the legal status of deference determinations as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Deference determinations shape much constitutional adjudication, and
yet the Supreme Court provides little guidance on how it makes such
determinations. When the Court reviews both legislative and administrative
policies, its consideration of the relevant political actor’s institutional
characteristics is haphazard and inconsistent. To this extent, deference
determinations share much in common with stealth constitutional
determinations more generally—unpredictability, imprecision, and opacity.

371. I should note here that while the Supreme Court deserves much of the criticism it
receives, it is also far easier to criticize judicial opinions than to write them. See Daniel B. Bogart,
Games Lawyers Play: Waivers of the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy and the Single Asset Loan Workout, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1117, 1132 n.4 (1996) (“As my students are wont to point out, it is far easier to
play armchair quarterback and criticize judicial opinions . . . than it is for the judge,
participating in the rough and tumble of judicial practice, to render them.”); Warren E. Burger,
School for Judges, 33 F.R.D. 139, 142 (1964) (“Generations of lawyers and judges, and of course
law teachers, have raised serious problems in judicial opinions but have found the problems
easier to raise than solve.”).
372. Janet Malcolm, The Art of Testifying, NEW YORKER, Mar. 13, 2006, at 79 (quoting thenJudge David Souter’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings).
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Far from being merely theoretical, these flaws pose difficulties for lower
courts and litigants trying to follow the Supreme Court’s approach to
questions of institutional deference. The Court could greatly improve its
analysis by paying greater attention to the actual institutional characteristics
and processes of the political branch at issue in a particular case, rather than
relying on generalizations about each branch’s strengths and weaknesses. An
institutional analysis would provide better incentives for the political
branches to make policy responsibly and force courts to provide more
thorough justifications for its deference determinations. Institutional
analysis may help courts reconsider stealth constitutional decision making
more generally and encourage courts to approach such determinations with
greater consistency, candor, and theoretical rigor.

